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Articles 
PUNCTILIOS AND NONPROFIT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE—A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT
NONPROFIT DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Thomas Lee Hazen* & Lisa Love Hazen** 
The law on nonprofit directors’ obligations is sparse and fragmented.  
Most of the discussion over the years is lore rather than law based on 
commentators’ suggestions for best practices.  This article attempts a 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the law relating to nonprofit 
directors’ obligations.  On the one hand, there is a basis for suggesting that 
since nonprofits implicate public trust issues, nonprofit directors should be 
held to standards higher than those imposed on for-profit directors.  On the 
other hand, in order to attract people to serve on nonprofit boards, states 
generally offer more insulation from director liability than is found in the 
for-profit world.  How can this apparent contradiction be reconciled? 
Perhaps the solution lies in recognizing that truly altruistic motivations for 
serving on nonprofit boards will result in directors having their own 
internal incentive to do the right thing and put in the time and effort 
necessary for effective nonprofit monitoring.  To the extent that it is too 
Pollyannaish to expect the best from people, this article explores nonprofit 
directors’ responsibilities and how they relate to the law limiting directors’ 
accountability.
1
 
* Thomas Lee Hazen is the Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
** Lisa Love Hazen has served on a number of nonprofit and charitable boards of 
directors. 
1. For a discussion of North Carolina law and some of the issues discussed in this
article, see Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Increased Scrutiny of Nonprofit 
Directors, 90 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nonprofit organizations generally have a governing board.  Members 
of those governing boards are regarded as fiduciaries.  However, this just 
begins the analysis.  As Justice Felix Frankfurter observed in an oft-quoted 
passage: “[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives 
direction to further inquiry.  To whom is he a fiduciary?  What obligations 
does he owe as a fiduciary?  In what respect has he failed to discharge these 
obligations?”2  This article explores these questions in the context of 
nonprofit organizations
3
 and then evaluates the perceived need for 
heightened standards of responsibility, but is mindful not to discourage 
good nonprofit directors from volunteering because of the fear of draconian 
liability. 
Fiduciary relationships are entered into voluntarily and are recognized 
as placing the fiduciary under a zealous duty of good faith.
4
  Fiduciary 
relationships established by law often are mirrored by relationships 
established by custom reflecting positive social attributes including 
“loyalty, civility, self-sacrifice, vocational excellence, and high standards 
of honesty.”5  The law thus recognizes that a fiduciary relationship entails a 
strong duty of the utmost loyalty.
6
  This loyalty obligation means that the 
fiduciary must act solely in the beneficiary’s best interests rather than 
acting in the fiduciary’s own interests.7  It is impossible to distill the scope 
of a fiduciary’s obligations into a bright-line formula.  “[T]he various 
descriptions of fiduciary relationships share a common thread—the 
existence of heightened obligations” in contrast to legal “obligations 
resulting in non-fiduciary arm’s length transactions.”8  This is reflected in 
2. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1942).
3. One way to describe a fiduciary’s obligation is the focus on others’ interests, rather
than on one’s own self-interest.  See Ira Mark Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit 
Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REV. 999, 1021 n.51 (1982) (“It has also been said that the core 
feature of charity is that it is not ‘self-regarding,’ but ‘other-regarding.’”). 
4. See, e.g., Scott Fitzgibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. 
L. REV. 303, 304, 308–09 (1999); see also, e.g., Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 902 (1988) (discussing autonomy as
a key assumption of fiduciary relationships).
5. Fitzgibbon, supra note 4, at 340.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 163–92 (discussing various aspects of the duty of
loyalty held by directors). 
7. See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND.
L. REV. 1399, 1488 (2002).
8. Thomas Lee Hazen, Are Existing Stock Broker Standards Sufficient? Principles,
Rules and Fiduciary Duties, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 710, 727 (2010).  In addition, 
following the rule for fiduciary duties generally, nonprofit directors may not delegate or 
otherwise contract out of their obligations of due care.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 320 cmt. (a)(2) (Tentative Draft 
350 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:2 
Justice Cardozo’s famous mantra that fiduciaries owe a “punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive.”9 
Most nonprofit organizations are set up as corporations or as trusts.
10
  
There are many varieties of nonprofit corporations.  Some are set up for 
charitable purposes.  Others are established to produce goods and 
services.
11
  Nonprofits are found in all shapes and sizes: 
The world of nonprofits has changed significantly over time; 
some have continued to operate as small, neighborhood 
charitable organizations, while others have transformed 
themselves into large, quasi-business operations, similar to their 
behemoth corporate counterparts.  As with any group of this size, 
nonprofit activities vary widely, with organizations ranging from 
traditional charities, such as neighborhood soup kitchens and the 
Red Cross, to hospitals run in a manner similar to for-profit 
hospitals, to even the National Football League.  Contrary to 
popular belief, private philanthropy is not the main source of 
nonprofit revenue; rather, over forty percent of nonprofit revenue 
is derived from fees for services performed.  Although the size of 
the nonprofit sector has been rapidly increasing, financial support 
from the government has been falling over time, thereby causing 
nonprofits to become more “market-oriented in their operations, 
but at the price of posing questions about the legitimacy of the 
special tax and other privileges that they enjoy.”12 
Nonprofit corporations may be established for charitable (sometimes 
referred to as public benefit corporations) or religious purposes and those 
No. 1, 2007) (emphasizing that fiduciaries must personally perform their duties and 
regulating their ability to delegate their responsibilities). 
9. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the 
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”). 
10. Unincorporated nonprofits are governed in many states as unincorporated nonprofit
associations.  See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 59B (2009). 
11. For a discussion of the economic role of nonprofits and evaluation of the
justifications for the charitable tax exemption, see Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for 
Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 89 Yale L.J. 835 
(1980); see also, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for 
Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 Stetson L. Rev. 395 (1997). 
12. Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 929 (2003) (footnotes omitted) (quoting LESTER M. 
SALAMON ET AL., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY: DIMENSIONS OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 271, 275, 
280 (1999)); see also, e.g., Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 925 N.E.2d 
1131 (Ill. 2010) (denying state property tax exemption to hospital that was not providing the 
charitable care necessary to retain nonprofit status). 
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nonprofits are generally entitled to tax benefits.
13
  There are also mutual 
benefit nonprofit corporations, such as trade associations, homeowners’ 
associations and the like, which are common examples of mutual benefit 
corporations that are governed by the nonprofit rather than business 
corporation act of the state of incorporation, yet do not receive favored tax 
exempt treatment.
14
  This article focuses on the obligations of public benefit 
or charitable nonprofit directors and does not address mutual benefit 
entities where the interests are purely private and there is no public mission 
involved.  There is no single unified body of law that applies to charities 
and other nonprofits.  Instead, the law in this area is fragmented.  Although 
there have been repeated suggestions for a more unified approach,
15
 
legislators and policy makers have not heeded that message.  Instead, the 
law regulating nonprofit and charitable governance remains an amalgam of 
trust law, corporate law, and tax law.
16
  This article analyzes these various 
fragments in an attempt to provide a more unified explanation of the 
current law. 
Given the more than two hundred year history of corporate law in the 
United States, nonprofit corporation acts are relatively new.
17
  Prior to the 
advent of enabling laws directed to nonprofit corporations, there was 
considerable law governing the obligations of trustees of charitable trusts.
18
  
13. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2011).
14. The former version of the Revised Model Nonprofit Act divided nonprofits into
three categories:  public benefit, mutual benefit, and religious nonprofits.  REVISED MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(a)(2) (1988).  While these are good generic descriptions of the 
various types of nonprofits, they never caught on as a matter of statutory distinction.  
Accordingly, the most recent version of the Revised Model Nonprofit Act follows the 
pattern of most states in having one category of nonprofit corporation.  Id. 
15. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled
State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 477 (1960) (calling for a centralized law of 
charities); William F. Jarvis, Comment, The Nonprofit Director’s Fiduciary Duty: Toward a 
New Theory of the Nonprofit Sector, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 34 (1982) (lamenting the absence of 
any meaningful unification of the law of charities). 
16. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999). 
17. The movement towards dedicated nonprofit corporation statutes began in the 1950s.
See, e.g., Note, The Charitable Corporation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1168 (1951) (discussing the 
evolving charitable corporation).  Prior to the modern form of nonprofit corporation acts, 
nonprofit organizations and charities could incorporate as non-stock corporations or through 
a specific charter issued by the state.  For example, Harvard College was incorporated in 
1650.  Id. at 1168, n.5 (citing A. M. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS IN THE DAYS OF THE COLONY 18 
(1894)). 
18. Karst, supra note 15, at 435 (noting that
[T]here is a branch of trust law applicable to charitable trustees, and an entirely
separate set of rules governing officers and directors of incorporated charities.
While the duties of charitable trustees have been developed in great detail over
a period of centuries, the great and rapid increase in the number and aggregate
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While some more recent decisions continue the trust analogy, the general 
view today in the context of nonprofit corporations is to refer to principles 
of corporate rather than trust law.
19
 
When charitable nonprofits provide products or services like a private 
business or in fact operate a business, the oversight obligations of directors 
are clearly implicated since it is the board’s obligation to oversee 
operations and help assure that charitable tax exempt status is preserved.
20
  
There can be confusing overlap between nonprofit and for-profit 
enterprises.
21
  This confusion is exacerbated by large businesses such as 
nonprofit hospitals and other commercial enterprises operated through a 
nonprofit entity.
22
 
wealth of charitable corporations has taken the law by surprise. As a 
consequence, the managers of corporate charity are still, at this late date, 
without adequate guides for conduct. 
). 
19. See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses &
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974) (“[T]he modern trend is to apply 
corporate rather than trust principles in determining the liability of the directors of charitable 
corporations, because their functions are virtually indistinguishable from those of their 
‘pure’ corporate counterparts.”); see also, e.g., Joseph J. Rucci, Jr., Directors of Nonprofit 
Organizations: Litigation Exposure and Protection, 9 CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
1009 (2011) (noting that “[r]ecent high-profile litigation should be a wake up call for boards 
to improve their oversight of management.”). 
20. See infra notes 89–134 and accompanying text.  Cf. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715
N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (upholding attorney general’s complaint seeking to hold 
directors accountable for excessive compensation and mismanagement of university’s assets 
and denying defendants’ claim for advanced indemnification); see id. at 728 (noting that 
[T]he Regents found “that Lois neglected both his duties of due care and
undivided loyalty to Adelphi,” and that he “violated his fiduciary duty by failing
to disclose to the board that LOIS/USA was, indeed, being paid for services
rendered to Adelphi.”  The Regents concluded that Diamandopoulos and Lois
should be removed “for neglect of their fiduciary duties of due care and
loyalty.”  The Regents also found “that the full board of trustees neglected its
duty of due care to Adelphi by failing to take appropriate action once it learned
of Procope’s and Lois’ potential conflicts.”  They recommended removal of the
18 trustees “for neglect of their duty of due care.”  The Regents did not address
whether Lois’ company received excessive payment for the work which was
done.
). 
21. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of
the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 457 
(1996) (discussing the differences between nonprofit and for-profit corporations and 
suggesting that this may be a situation where “a distinction long believed to be a difference 
of kind turns out to be a difference of degree”). 
22. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV.
1400, 1408 (1998) (“Explosive growth and expansion into commercial activities have 
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There has been much debate as to whether organizations that in fact 
operate a business should be able to enjoy nonprofit charitable tax exempt 
status.
23
  Some have argued that we should move to a new model of for-
profit charities.
24
  Others propose stricter limits on nonprofit organizations’ 
for-profit activities.
25
 
A specific example of the debate surrounding the federal tax 
exemption is the concern in recent years that nonprofit hospitals are really 
disguised for-profit enterprises with an undeserved tax advantage.
26
  In 
transformed the typical charity from a perpetual fund invested by trustees into a modern 
enterprise subject to the management demands of a complex operating business.”). 
23. Many scholars have analyzed the wisdom of the subsidy for charitable nonprofits.
See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax 
Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601 (2011) (discussing the charitable tax exemption as a 
subsidy); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010) (discussing the tax exempt subsidy in 
terms of distributive justice); James R. Hines Jr., Jill R. Horwitz & Austin Nichols, The 
Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1179 (2010) 
(discussing the wisdom of subsidizing charitable activities that are in fact for-profit 
operations); Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 
(2011) (discussing the fine distinction between operating nonprofit corporations and for-
profit corporations); Seong J. Kim, Note, Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil: A Guide For 
Non-Profit Corporations With For-Profit Subsidiaries, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 189 (2009) 
(noting the fuzzy line between for-profit corporations and certain nonprofits). 
24. See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the
Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 571 (2009) (“[T]he government must avoid 
discriminating—particularly when setting tax policy—between nonprofits and corporations 
that do good deeds.”); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 
VA. L. REV. 2017, 2019–23 (2007) (arguing that if the charity tax subsidy is retained, it 
should be made available for business entities that engage in good works). 
25. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Keeping Charity Charitable, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1213 (2010)
(arguing that the government should maintain the current charitable versus for-profit 
distinction and that the cost of allowing tax benefits for the charitable work of for-profit 
corporations is not worth the potential benefit).  This article does not address that debate. 
Rather, we focus on the appropriate standards for nonprofit directors. 
26. See, e.g., Leigh Walton, Hospital Syndications: Opportunities and Options, or
Poised for Extinction?, 21 HEALTH LAWYER 1 (2009) (discussing financing by syndication 
of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals); Laura L. Folkerts, Note, Do Nonprofit Hospitals 
Provide Community Benefit? A Critique of the Standards for Proving Deservedness of 
Federal Tax Exemptions, 34 J. CORP. L. 611 (2009) (questioning whether the community 
benefit requirement adequately distinguishes nonprofit from for-profit hospitals); Roger P. 
Meyers, Note, Risky Ventures: The Impact of IRS Health Care Joint Venture Policy, 42 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 481 (2009) (discussing the fine line between for-profit and nonprofit in 
the context of healthcare joint ventures).  Cf. Julia L. Davis, Contracts, Control And Charter 
Schools: The Success of Charter Schools Depends on Stronger Nonprofit Board Oversight 
to Preserve Independence and Prevent Domination by For-Profit Management Companies, 
2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1 (2011) (discussing the fine line between for-profit and nonprofit 
organizations in the context of charter schools); Oksana Koltk, Comment, Chasing Profits—
Disregarding Values: Legal Persona of Elite Schools And Their Destructive Tax-Exempt 
Status, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1073 (2009) (decrying the commercialization of nonprofit 
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2010, Congress addressed this problem when it enacted the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, which adopted a new section, 501(r)
27
 
of the tax code, that places additional requirements on hospitals with 
section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
28
  The new provisions include a 
community health needs assessment,
29
 a financial assistance policy,
30
 and 
limitations on charges
31
 in order to maintain 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status.
32
  
These new requirements necessarily impact board obligations.  They are 
added to the other aspects of the organization’s activities the board must 
law schools and suggesting how it can affect their charitable status). 
27. I.R.C. § 501(r) (2011) (listing additional requirements for certain hospitals, such as
community health needs assessment requirements and financial assistance policy 
requirements). 
28. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-48 § 9007,
124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified at I.R.C. § 501(r) (2011)).  See also, e.g., James E. Tyrrell, 
III, Non-Profits Under Fire: The Effects of Minimal Charity Care Requirements Legislation 
on Not-for Profit Hospitals, 26 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 373 (2010) (analyzing the 
proposed Illinois Tax-exempt Hospital Responsibility Act). 
29. A nonprofit hospital must conduct a “community health needs assessment” at least
once every three years and adopt an “implementation strategy” to meet the needs identified 
by the assessment.  I.R.C. § 501(r)(3).  This assessment must take into account input from a 
broad cross-section of the community served by the hospital, including those with special 
knowledge of or expertise in public health, and must be made widely available to the public.  
Id.  See also Gloria J. Bazzoli & Jan P. Clement, Community Benefit Activities of Private, 
Nonprofit Hospitals, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 999 (2010) (discussing the meaning of 
“community benefits”); Lynnore Seaton, Tax-Exempt Hospitals and Community Benefit, 21 
HEALTH LAWYER 37 (2009) (discussing the community benefit standard); Michele R. 
Goodman, Note, Putting the Community Back in Community Benefit: Proposed State Tax 
Exemption Standard For Nonprofit Hospitals, 84 IND. L.J. 713 (2009) (proposing state tax 
exemption for community based hospitals). 
30. A § 501(c)(3) “charitable” hospital must establish, implement, and make widely
available written policies regarding financial assistance and emergency medical care.  I.R.C. 
§ 501(r)(4). There must be a financial assistance policy specifying eligibility criteria
(including whether the assistance includes free or discounted care) and state how the
hospital calculates the amounts that are billed to patients.  Id.  See, e.g., David T. Lewis,
New Billing and Financial Assistance Requirements for Tax-Exempt Hospitals, 12 J. 
HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 6, 53–55 (Nov.–Dec. 2010) (urging the need for hospitals to
develop policies required by PPACA, such as financial assistance policies and limitations on
charges for emergency care).
31. A nonprofit hospital must limit charges for emergency or other medically necessary
care that is provided to patients eligible for financial assistance and the charges cannot be in 
excess of the lowest amounts charged to insured patients.  Amanda W. Thai, Note, Is 
Senator Grassley Our Savior?: The Crusade Against “Charitable” Hospitals Attacking 
Patients for Unpaid Bills, 96 IOWA L. REV. 761 (2011).  The hospital’s policy must also 
prohibit the use of “gross charges” when billing individuals who qualify for financial 
assistance.  Id.  In addition there must be a policy relating to limitations on billing and 
collections practices.  Id. 
32. I.R.C. § 501(r).
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monitor in order to preserve nonprofit status.  It is not just tax laws that 
have impacted hospital governance, as state attorneys general have invoked 
their authority under state law to challenge perceived lapses in nonprofit 
governance.
33
  Hospital boards also have oversight obligations regarding 
the quality of the healthcare provided.
34
 
II. OVERVIEW OF NONPROFIT GOVERNING BOARD DUTIES
Nonprofit organizations can be established with either an advisory 
board or with a governing board.  Unlike formal governing boards, 
advisory boards do not have either statutory authority or statutory 
obligations.  In contrast, when a board is established as a formal governing 
board, board members have fiduciary obligations.  Nonprofit corporation 
acts, following the pattern of business corporation acts, establish a default 
governing structure that includes a board of directors.
35
  Qualification for 
IRS tax-exempt status is easier if the charitable organization is formed as a 
nonprofit corporation.
36
  Accordingly, it is very common for nonprofits to 
have a governing board of directors.  Nonprofits board duties are generally 
described as a duty of care, a duty of loyalty, and a duty of good faith.
37
  
Also, there often is reference to a duty of obedience.
38
  While it has been 
debated as to how many fiduciary duties directors must in fact adhere to, 
the categorization is less important than the substance.
39
 
33. John D. Blum, The Quagmire of Hospital Governance, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 43–45
(2010). 
34. See Tracy E. Miller & Valerie L. Gutmann, Changing Expectations for Board
Oversight of Healthcare Quality: The Emerging Paradigm, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 31 
(2009) (suggesting the emergence of an emerging paradigm for board oversight of 
healthcare quality, and recommending increased  consideration of comparative quality 
measures and transparency). 
35. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.01(a) (2008).
36. See, e.g., James K. Weeks, The Not-For-Profit Business Corporation, 19 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 303, 307 (1970) (suggesting it is easier to obtain a federal tax exemption if the
organization is recognized as a charitable entity under state law but also noting that such
status is not by itself sufficient).
37. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS §§ 315 (duty of care), 330
(conflicts of interest) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (hereinafter ALI NONPROFIT PRINCIPLES). 
38. See, e.g., Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct. App.
1977) (dealing with action brought by the state attorney general where a nonprofit breached 
the duty of obedience in using funds for medical clinics instead of for operating a hospital). 
See discussion infra Part IX. 
39. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties are There in Corporate
Law?, 83 SO. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1257–76 (2010) (explaining that the existing debates are 
largely semantic and that fiduciary duties are too important to be oversimplified into two or 
three categories).  Professor Velasco suggests five paradigms for enforcement that he 
believes will provide a better framework for analyzing directors’ duties.  The five paradigms 
he suggests are:  (1) process (gross negligence), (2) conflicts of interest (fairness), (3) bias 
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The duties of nonprofit directors to a large extent parallel the 
obligations of for-profit directors.
40
  The duty of care is basically a 
negligence standard as it requires directors to act in a manner consistent 
with reasonably prudent directors under like circumstances.
41
  In order to 
live up to their duty of care, directors must keep themselves informed about 
the organization’s operations.42  The duty of loyalty is implicated when a 
board member has a conflict of interest and at a minimum the conflicted 
board member should not participate in any related decision-making.
43
  The 
duty of good faith is sometimes referred to as a separate obligation but is 
also a part of the duties of care and loyalty.
44
  The duty of obedience is 
sometimes referred to as a way of describing the board’s obligation to 
remain faithful to the organization’s purpose and mission.45  These duties 
are discussed in more detail throughout this article.  Although this article’s 
focus is on nonprofit directors, it is worth mentioning that even in the wake 
of corporate governance reforms and heightened accountability, there still 
is legitimate concern over whether for-profit corporate boards are fulfilling 
their obligations in a satisfactory manner.
46
 
(reasonableness), (4) misconduct (intent), and (5) substance (waste).  Id. at 1235. 
40. Although this article’s focus is on nonprofit directors, it is worth mentioning that
even in the wake of corporate governance reforms and heightened accountability, there is 
still legitimate concern over whether for-profit corporate boards are fulfilling their 
obligations in a satisfactory manner.  See, e.g., MCKINSEY & COMPANY, McKinsey Global 
Survey Results: Governance Since the Economic Crisis, in MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 1, 4 
(2011) (indicating that (1) 44% of respondents indicated that their boards simply review and 
approve proposed strategies of management, (2) only 25% of respondents characterized the 
overall performance of their boards as excellent or very good, (3) the number of boards that 
formally evaluate their directors has decreased during the past three years, and (4) only 
21% of directors purport to completely understand their company’s strategy).  Our concerns 
about insufficient accountability of nonprofit directors seem to have application to the for-
profit world as well. 
41. ALI NONPROFIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 37, § 315(b) (describing standard of
conduct). 
42. Id. § 315(a).
43. Id. § 330.
44. See, e.g., Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business
Judgment Rule in Delaware,  2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061 (2009) (discussing good faith under 
Delaware corporate law); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & 
Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in 
Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 673–88 (2010) (further discussing good faith under 
Delaware corporate law as well as “[t]he rise and demise of an independent duty of good 
faith”). 
45. See discussion infra Part IX.
46. Our concerns about insufficient accountability of nonprofit directors seem to have
application to the for-profit world as well.  See supra note 40. 
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III. INCREASED CONCERN OVER NONPROFIT BOARD ABUSES
Although the use of nonprofit corporations as the entity to carry out 
the operations of charitable foundations is relatively new, the nonprofit 
form has been used by educational and religious organizations for much 
longer.
47
  The state statutes enabling the formation of nonprofit 
corporations closely follow the for-profit model to the extent consistent 
with not-for-profit goals.
48
  Although modern nonprofit corporation statutes 
have been around for over fifty years,
49
 the law with respect to nonprofit 
directors’ responsibilities remains largely undeveloped.50  In 1998 former 
SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid noted that nonprofit board 
obligations are more aspirational than real and asked, “Can we continue to 
justify or afford—and will the public continue to tolerate—the relative 
ineffectiveness of nonprofit corporate governance and the virtual absence 
of accountability constraints?”51  He concluded that we cannot.  However, 
the law and practice has been slow to heed his concern.
52
  The past decade 
has witnessed corporate governance reforms and heightened scrutiny of the 
role of corporate directors.  These reforms have focused on business 
corporations and have not carried over to nonprofit corporations.
53
  This 
47. Note, The Charitable Corporation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1168 (1951); see also, e.g.,
HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 2a (rev. ed., 1946) (describing 
voluntary, non-corporate nonprofit associations). 
48. See, e.g., Robert S. Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation—A Neglected Stepchild
Comes of Age, 22 BUS. LAW. 951 (1967) (discussing nonprofit corporation statutes). 
49. Statutes governing nonprofit corporations date back to at least 1964.  See, e.g.,
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1964).  Legal scholarship discussing nonprofit corporations 
date back to at least 1954.  See, e.g., George Gleason Bogert, Proposed Legislation 
Regarding State Supervision of Charities, 52 MICH. L. REV. 633 (1954).  The Model 
Nonprofit Corporation Act was revised in 1987 and then again in 2008.  REVISED MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT (1988); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT 
(2009). 
50. See, e.g., Kara A. Gilmore, House Bill 1095: The New Nonprofit Corporation Law
for Missouri, 63 UMKC L. REV. 633 (1995) (noting the absence of fully developed 
nonprofit law); Thomas H. Boyd, Note, A Call to Reform the Duties of Directors Under 
State Not-For-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV. 725, 726 (1987) (noting that 
“states have failed to legislate clear and adequate general standards for not-for-profit 
directors’ conduct”). 
51. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors And Officers:
Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631, 653 (1998). 
52. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit
Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179 (2010) (calling for reinforced fiduciary duties and 
enhanced limitations on self-dealing and conflicts of interest). 
53. Cf. Robert A. Britton, Note, Making Disclosure Regulation Work in the Nonprofit
Sector, U. ILL. L. REV. 437 (2008) (suggesting a disclosure system “in which state and 
federal governments, acting in their roles as significant donors to the nonprofit sector, 
withhold government grants unless potential recipients voluntarily provide enhanced 
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article explores nonprofit directors—the forgotten fiduciaries.  There has 
been scant scholarly or legislative attention to nonprofit corporations 
notwithstanding the fact that abuses in the nonprofit world should be of 
equal concern as those in the for-profit world. 
Massive corporate frauds during the Enron era,
54
 and the aftermath of 
the 2008 financial meltdown each led to much concern over corporate 
governance and in particular the obligations of corporate directors.  The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
55
 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010
56
 instituted various corporate governance 
reforms.  These reforms were limited to publicly held for-profit 
corporations.  Notwithstanding scandals
57
 and concerns about executive 
financial and management disclosures”). 
54. Cf. Saori Horikawa & John Hempill, Serving on a Nonprofit Board in the Post
Enron Era, CORPORATE PRO BONO, http://www.cpbo.org/archive/resources/ 
resource1370.html (discussing a series of corporate and accounting scandals). 
55. Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002); see also Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002, S. Rep. No. 107-205 (2002) (regulating financial reporting, 
independent audits, and accounting services for public companies); Mae Kykendall & Elliott 
A. Spoon, Symposium, In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in the Life of
Sarbanes–Oxley—A Critical Review, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 271 (2004) (discussing
scholarly commentary on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and suggesting greater enforcement of the
statute).
56. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 704, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
57. See, e.g., Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century Trending Toward Decay, 11
FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2011) (discussing past scandals and calling for reform); Deborah A. 
DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131, 133 
(1993) (describing self-dealing by directors of United Way and the San Diego National 
Sports Training Foundation); Developments in the Law—Nonprofit Corporations, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1591 n.5 (1992) (citing to a journal article dealing with the law of non-
profit organizations); Goldschmid, supra note 51, at 653 (discussing United Way and 
Adelphi University’s problems with excessive executive compensation).   
 A poignant example of board failure occurred with respect to Five Rivers 
Community Development Corporation in South Carolina Community Action Program Legal 
Services.  See Jack B. Siegel, CAPLAW Governance Case Studies:  Case 1 The Executive 
Director’s Role Vis-a-Vis the Board, (2008),   http://www.caplaw.org/Case_Study_1_000. 
pdf.pdf  (discussing the demise of the  Five Rivers Community Development Corp.); David 
Wren, Board Not Consulted on Wages, SUN NEWS, Dec. 10, 2006, at A1 (discussing board 
ignorance of executive compensation); David Wren, Nonprofit Pay Rises Under Little 
Oversight, SUN NEWS, Aug. 20, 2006, at A1 (discussing self-dealing and excessive 
compensation in Five Rivers Community Development Corporation, a non-profit agency in 
Georgetown County); see also SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, BROKEN TRUST:
GREED, MISMANAGEMENT & POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA’S LARGEST CHARITABLE 
TRUST (2006) (chronicling the mismanagement and corruption of the Bishop estate that 
established a charitable trust); Rachel Penski, Note, The Case of CEO Richard Grasso and 
the NYSE: Proposals for Controlling Executive Compensation at Public Nonprofit 
Corporations, 58 VAND. L. REV. 339 (2005) (discussing the large compensation package for 
a former New York Stock Exchange CEO when the Exchange was a nonprofit corporation); 
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compensation
58
 in nonprofit corporations, these reforms did not apply to 
nonprofit corporations.  Although there was some movement to mandate 
reform of nonprofit governance,
59
 none came to fruition.
60
  However, 
James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 272–75 
(2003) (proposing charities commissions to serve as remedial function for charities’ abuses).  
But cf. Johnny Rex Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions Underlying the Federal Excise 
Taxation of Compensation Paid by Charities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 53 (2010) 
(criticizing increased regulation of nonprofit compensation through federal excise tax). 
58. New York is investigating nonprofit executive compensation after finding that
approximately 2,000 workers at nonprofits earn more than $100,000 per year.  Michael 
Gormley, NY Investigates Wages, Bureaucracy at Nonprofits, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2011, 
4:57 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP4581db54fc74471dae49c55cd0572df6.html 
(discussing the investigations taking place); see also Russ Buettner, Abused and Used: 
Reaping Millions for Nonprofit Care for Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/02/nyregion/for-executives-at-group-homes-generous-
pay-and-little-oversight.html (detailing how two executives of mental health nonprofit 
received more than one million dollars per year; one charged more than $50,000 for his 
daughter’s living expenses).   
 Another recent high profile example has been the California attorney general 
challenging excess compensation in a charitable foundation established by the owners of the 
Los Angeles Dodgers baseball team.  Katie Thomas & Michael S. Schmidt, Practices of 
Dodgers’ Charity Are Said to be Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010, at B14 
(describing the practices of the Dodgers in relation to charity); Katie Thomas & Michael S. 
Schmidt, Questions Arise About Executive’s Pay at Dodgers Charity, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2010, at B10 (detailing the questions surrounding executive compensation with respect to 
the Dodgers’ charity).  Executive compensation in the for-profit world has also been a major 
concern.  See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the 
Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 846 (2011) (analyzing the law’s ability to put a check on compensation of business 
executives). 
59. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, What Critiques of Sarbanes-Oxley Can Teach About
Regulation of Nonprofit Governance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 765 (2007) (discussing the areas 
in which the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has received a great deal of criticism); Marion R. 
Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations: Recent 
Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 609 (2007) 
(discussing proposals for increased regulation of nonprofits); Dana Brakman Reiser, Charity 
Law’s Essentials, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2011) (calling for enhanced regulation); Dana 
Brakman Reiser, There Ought to be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative 
Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 561 (2005) (concluding “that 
the ability of disclosure-based reforms to enhance nonprofit accountability may be 
overstated, but can be improved if legislatures recognize the limits of the for-profit analogy 
and refashion their reforms to complement enforcement”).  For a discussion of a potential 
extension of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to nonprofits, see Wendy K. Szymanski, An Allegory 
of Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit 
Organizations, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1303 (2003); Nichole Gilkeson, Note, For-Profit 
Scandal in the Nonprofit World: Should States Force Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions onto 
Nonprofit Corporations?, 95 GEO. L.J. 831 (2007); Joseph Mead, Note, Confidence in the 
Nonprofit Sector through Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Reforms, 106 MICH. L. REV. 881 (2008). 
But see, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is not Good for the Gander: 
Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007) (arguing that 
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nonprofit boards are wise to be cautious in setting executive compensation 
since as discussed later, there can be adverse implications with respect to 
tax-exempt status and investigations by the state attorney general.
61
  Even 
aside from the legal requirements, nonprofit boards should carefully 
scrutinize executive compensation since donors may be watching.
62
 
There has been much discussion about Sarbanes-Oxley reforms as a 
template for best practices for nonprofit boards.
63
  Some commentators 
contend that extending Sarbanes-Oxley reforms to nonprofits is not a good 
idea.
64
  Other commentators call for enhanced duties for nonprofit 
directors.
65
  Although there was no legislation at the federal level to extend 
Sarbanes-Oxley governance reforms would be of little use for nonprofits). 
60. See, e.g., Marion R. Fremont-Smith, The Search for Greater Accountability of
Nonprofit Organizations: Recent Legal Developments and Proposals for Change, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 609 (2007) (discussing developments and proposals in state law and IRS 
regulations); Anne-Marie Rhodes, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An 
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010) (discussing and evaluating 
various approached to reforming the law governing management of charities). 
61. See infra Part V (dealing with IRS consequences) and infra Part XII.C (state
attorney general). 
62. See, e.g., Paul B. Firstenberg & Frederick S. Lane, Setting CEO Pay Must be Done
With Care to Avoid Donors’ Wrath, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 2011, at 31, 33 
(discussing a number of factors that can aid in the determination of CEO compensation). 
63. See, e.g., PEGGY M. JACKSON & TONI E. FOGARTY, SARBANES-OXLEY FOR
NONPROFITS: A GUIDE TO BUILDING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (2005) (discussing relevance 
of Sarbanes-Oxley principles to nonprofits); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why 
Sarbanes Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 205 (2004) (discussing the limits of borrowing from Sarbanes-Oxley for nonprofits);
Jane Heath, Note, Who’s Minding the Nonprofit Store: Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have Anything
to Offer Nonprofits?, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 781 (2004) (focusing on various tenets of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that showcase the major themes intended by the Act to promote public
confidence, and thereby investment in for-profit corporations; non-profits can also benefit
from public confidence in similar ways); Ralph E. DeJong, Update on Governance Best
Practices for Exempt Organizations, 2006 ABATAX-CLE 0505027, available on Westlaw
(ABA Section of Taxation May 5, 2006); F. Sheffield Hale, Public Company Best Practices
for Nonprofits, 26 ACC Docket, Apr. 2008, at 58 (setting forth suggested best practices for
nonprofit corporations).  Cf. Aseem Prakash & Mary Kay Gugerty, Trust But Verify?
Voluntary Regulation Programs in the Nonprofit Sector, 4 REGULATION & GOVERNANCE 22
(2010) (discussing voluntary regulation programs as an alternative way to resolve agency
problems in nonprofits).
64. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit
Governance?, 75 TENN. L. REV. 83, 136 (2007) (arguing that the “ongoing move toward 
board and director independence in the nonprofit sector appears to be a movement without a 
clear goal, supported by little evidence that independence has accomplished improvements 
in the business sector”). 
65. See, e.g., Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The Changing Accountability
Climate and Resulting Demands for Improved “Fiduciary Capacity” Affecting the World of 
Public Charities, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1 (2004) (noting increased board duties). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley type requirements to nonprofits, there was some movement 
in the states.  For example, under California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act of 
2004,
66
 charitable nonprofits that bring in an annual revenue of more than 
$2 million must be audited, the results of which are publicly available and 
must have an audit committee whose composition is publicly available and 
does not overlap more than fifty percent with the finance committee.
67
 
As more fully discussed below, the tools and remedies for monitoring 
nonprofits are limited.
68
  Even with limited remedies, a benefit of 
articulating high standards for nonprofit directors is the hope that most 
nonprofit directors will adhere to the articulated standards.
69
  It may seem a 
bit too much like Pollyanna to suggest that directors will follow the higher 
standards even without heightened remedies.  However, being a nonprofit 
director is a thankless job and many such directors are likely to see board 
service as part of their philanthropy.  As such, their commitment to the 
cause and sense of doing what is right certainly will have some salutary 
effect even if it is not sufficient in itself. 
Following the pattern of business corporation law, the basic formation 
and governance rules for nonprofit corporations are governed by state 
law.
70
  Although there may be nuanced differences in state nonprofit 
corporation acts,
71
 they share much common ground.  The most significant 
recent reforms in the nonprofit area have come in through the tax laws 
rather than state corporate law.  This represents a piecemeal approach to the 
problem.
72
  There have been suggestions that the states’ nonprofit corporate 
laws
73
 should take more of a role or that there should be a more holistic 
66. SB 1262 (Sept. 29, 2004), 2004 CAL. STAT. 919 (2011); see also, e.g., 2005 Conn.
Acts 101 (Reg. Sess.) (regulating the solicitation of charitable funds); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 7:28 (2004).
67. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12586 (2011).  In addition, all nonprofits regardless of size
must make their audited financial statements available to the public and, consistent with IRS 
Forms 990, must disclose the compensation of President, CEO, Treasurer and CFO 
approved by the board.  Id. 
68. See infra Part XII.
69. James Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7
PACE L. REV. 389 (1986). 
70. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
2:4 (3d ed. 2010) (hereinafter “COX & HAZEN”). 
71. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate
Directors—Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
72. See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in The 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11
Fla. Tax L. Rev. 1 (2011) (noting the piecemeal reform in defining “charitable” for tax 
purposes and suggesting it is time to take a longer view of the problem rather than simply 
react to each scandal or controversy as it occurs). 
73. Cf. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the
Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479 (2010) 
(arguing that state-based regulation is more appropriate than relying on IRS rules). 
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approach to federal regulation.
74
  While such fundamental changes in 
regulatory structure might be warranted, that is not the focus of this article.  
This article explores the more basic question of whether existing law 
respecting nonprofit directors is adequate.  Thus, this article explores the 
current law by examining how current state nonprofit law and the IRS rules 
currently operate and what existing standards in fact do apply to nonprofit 
directors. 
Legal scholarship on nonprofit charitable organizations has focused on 
a number of discrete issues.  For example, there is a debate as to whether 
heightened scrutiny of nonprofit director fiduciary duties is appropriate.
75
  
There is analysis of the 2008 IRS enhanced disclosure requirements
76
 and 
discussion as to whether they are beneficial.
77
  Commentators have debated 
the wisdom of applying Sarbanes-Oxley enhanced governance 
requirements to nonprofits either by statutory mandate or voluntarily as a 
matter of identifying best practices.
78
  The scholarly literature tends to be 
fragmented, generally treating tax and state law issues separately.  Current 
literature thus lacks a unified analysis of nonprofit directors’ obligations 
considering state law governance standards as they are impacted by the IRS 
requirements.  This article fills that gap.  Even without considering 
additional reforms, there is much groundwork in existing law for 
addressing the shortfall in nonprofit directors’ accountability. 
Much wrongdoing in the area of nonprofit corporations can be traced 
to the absence of good governance procedures and to the lack of 
transparency.
79
  At a minimum, nonprofit boards should be committed to 
74. See, e.g., HOWARD L. OLECK, NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND 
ASSOCIATIONS 457, 575 (2d ed. 1965) (calling for a centralized agency modeled on the SEC 
supervisory agency for nonprofits on the federal level rather than a branch of the IRS); Terri 
Lynn Helge, Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of The Charitable Sector Through a 
Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2009) (arguing for a 
federal regulator other than the IRS); Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable 
Dollar: an Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 476 (1960) (suggesting a 
centralized state board supervise private charities rather than the attorney general). 
75. See infra note 129 (pertaining to what level of scrutiny is appropriate in assessing
the fiduciary duties of nonprofit directors). 
76. In 2008, effective 2009, the IRS increased the disclosures required on Form 990
that must be filed annually.  See infra Part V. 
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
CASES AND MATERIALS 124 (4th ed. 2010) (noting the many “[e]xamples of poor judgment, 
ethical lapses and outright fraud . . . throughout these materials” and asserting that 
“[n]othing so tarnishes the nonprofit sector’s halo than wrongdoing by charities.  More often 
than not, these actions indicate inadequate corporate governance procedures and a lack of 
transparency of the organization’s activities.  Good governance is the implementation of 
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effective oversight of the organizations’ operations and also to assuring 
transparency.  The principal functions of a nonprofit can be distilled into 
six categories: 
(1) to select, encourage, advise, evaluate and, if need be, replace
the chief executive officer; (2) to review and adopt long-term
strategic directions and to approve specific objectives, financial
and other, such as reviewing the basic mission of the organization
in light of changed circumstances; (3) to ensure to the extent
possible that the necessary resources, including human resources,
will be available to pursue the strategies and achieve the
organization’s objectives; (4) to monitor the performance of
management; (5) to ensure that the organization operates
responsibly as well as effectively; and (6) to nominate suitable
candidates for election to the board, and to establish and carry out
an effective system of governance at the board level, including
evaluation of board performance.
80
IV. THE NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE CONUNDRUM
Consideration of nonprofit directors’ duties presents a conundrum.  
The conundrum is that while the law imposes high standards of 
responsibility on nonprofit directors, it incongruously includes significant 
limitations on board accountability for wrongdoing or lack of oversight.  
On the one hand, as is the case with for-profit corporations, the trustee-like 
obligations of overseeing a nonprofit corporation’s assets and operations 
result in directors being held to duties of care and loyalty.
81
  These duties in 
nonprofits are highlighted by the public trust that results from the states’ 
and Internal Revenue Service’s82 grant of nonprofit and preferential non-tax 
certain principles and policies that should protect the organization from misconduct.”) 
80. Id. at 127; see also Peggy Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-
Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond The Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1485, 1501 (2003) (providing a ten-factor list of nonprofit board 
responsibilities), citing Michael W. Peregrine & James R. Schwartz, The Business Judgment 
Rule and Other Protections for the Conduct of Not-for-Profit Directors, 33 J. HEALTH L. 
455, 458 (2000) (describing protective measures in place for directors of non-profit 
organizations); RICHARD T. INGRAM, What are the basic responsibilities of nonprofit 
boards? in TEN BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES OF NONPROFIT BOARDS (2d ed. 2009) (describing 
such basic responsibilities as determining the organization’s mission and purpose, selecting 
the chief executive, supporting and evaluating the chief executive, ensuring effective 
planning, monitoring and strengthening programs and services, protecting assets and 
providing financial oversight, building a competent board, ensuring legal and ethical 
integrity, and enhancing the organizations’ public standing).  
81. See infra Part VI.
82. Cf. Karen Donnelly, Note, Good Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the Business
Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and Accountability?, 
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status.
83
  Effective in 2008, the IRS imposed enhanced disclosure 
requirements on the Form 990 that must be filed by nonprofits with tax-
exempt status.
84
  The conundrum is further complicated because, unlike 
publicly held for-profit corporations, nonprofit directors usually are not 
compensated and thus serve as volunteers.
85
 
V. FEDERAL TAX LAW IMPACT ON NONPROFIT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
Since Congress has long viewed charities as providing a public good, 
it provides a government subsidy
86
 in the form of tax exempt status.  Some 
observers have criticized the wisdom of a government subsidy,
87
 especially 
when the nonprofit is engaging in business operations.
88
  We view the tax-
exempt subsidy as an appropriate way to encourage charitable endeavors.  
However, when nonprofit organization operations stretch the limits of bona 
79 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 163 (2010) (criticizing the IRS’s expansion of Form 990 as an 
unfortunate intrusion on corporate governance and the business judgment rule). 
83. See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit Governance:
Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 (2007) (cautioning against 
the corporatization of nonprofit board governance lest the charitable goals be obscured). 
84. For a general history of Form 990, see Chronological History: Redesign of the 2008
Form 990 and Corresponding Instructions, IRS, 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id= 185892,00.html (last updated July 1, 
2011). 
85. See infra Part X (discussing compensated versus volunteer directors) and infra Part
XII.E (discussing the liability shield available to volunteer nonprofit directors).
86. E.g., Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity, supra note 23 (discussing the charitable tax
exemption as a subsidy); Daniel I. Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a 
Subsidy?, 64 TAX. L. REV. 283 (2011) (discussing the various tax exemptions for charities 
and their impact as a subsidy). 
87. Kelly Phillips Erb, Taxing Non-Profits: Is It the Modern Day Solution to Balancing
Budgets?, FORBES (May 11, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011 
/05/11/taxing-non-profits-is-it-the-modern-day-solution-to-balancing-budgets/; Stephanie 
Strom, States Move to Revoke Charities’ Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2010, at 
A21.  But see, e.g., BRUCE R. HOPKINS, Why Are Nonprofits Tax-exempt?, in LEGAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF NONPROFIT BOARDS (1st ed. 2003).  The government, in fact, provides 
an indirect subsidy to nonprofits and receives a direct benefit in return.  Nonprofits also 
benefit the society as a whole when they provide valuable services.”  Id. 
88. See, e.g., Nina J. Crim, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for
Charitable Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 461 (1998) 
(discussing the rationales underlying the exemption and then noting that “an organization 
uses resources to engage in some noncharitable activities—that is, activities that are 
unrelated to its purpose constraint.”); Tommy F. Thompson, The Unadministrability of the 
Federal Charitable Tax Exemption: Causes, Effects, and Remedies, 5 VA. TAX REV. 1 
(1985) (discussing the difficulties in identifying which organizations are worthy of the 
federal tax exemption). 
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fide charitable activities, governing board accountability is essential to 
avoiding abuse of the nonprofit entity.  A nonprofit organization bears the 
burden of establishing the qualification for any applicable tax exemption.
89
 
Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code grants tax-exempt status for 
qualifying nonprofit organizations.
90
  The federal tax exemption for 
charitable organizations dates back to 1894.
91
  The current federal tax code 
lists twenty-eight categories of qualifying nonprofits.  Most charitable 
nonprofits fall under section 501(c)(3), which provides exemptions for 
organizations that serve religious, charitable, literary, or scientific 
purposes, and for educational organizations and organizations that test for 
public safety.
92
  The long-lived justification for exemption from federal tax 
89. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 925 N.E.2d 1131, 1144 (Ill.
2010) (denying state property tax exemption to hospital that was not providing the charitable 
care necessary to retain nonprofit status, finding that it had not met its burden in establishing 
entitlement to the exemption).   
90. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2011); see, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574,
589 (1983) (“What little floor debate occurred on the charitable exemption provision of the 
1894 Act and similar sections of later statutes leaves no doubt that Congress deemed the 
specified organizations entitled to tax benefits because they served desirable public 
purposes.”); BORIS I. BITKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 100.1 (2011) ( 
[T]he Internal Revenue Code . . . exempts . . . charitable institutions, schools,
colleges, churches, and the like . . . [as well as] chambers of commerce, labor
unions, and consumer cooperative societies [that] are operated primarily for the
economic benefit of their members, and they are nonprofit groups only in the
limited sense that they do not engage in business with the general public for the
benefit of investors.
). 
91. Act of Aug. 27, 1894, Chapter 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (“nothing herein contained
shall apply to . . . corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely 
for charitable, religious, or educational purposes”).  For further history see BITKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 90; JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 294–314 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the history of 
and rationales for the tax exemption); JOHN D. COLUMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE
CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION (1995) (discussing the justification for the charitable 
exemption); Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable 
Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in 4 COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY 
AND PUB. NEEDS, RESEARCH PAPERS 2035–36 (1977) (describing the history and 
justifications for the tax exemption); Charles A. Borek, Decoupling Tax Exemption for 
Charitable Organization, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 188–201 (2004) (discussing the 
evolution of the tax exemption). 
92. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  As explained by the IRS:
To be tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, an
organization must be organized and operated exclusively for exempt purposes
set forth in section 501(c)(3), and none of its earnings may inure to any private
shareholder or individual.  In addition, it may not be an action organization, i.e.,
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for charitable organizations is that qualifying charities provide a public 
good.  As explained by the Supreme Court: 
When the Government grants exemptions or allows deductions 
all taxpayers are affected; the very fact of the exemption or 
deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be said to 
be indirect and vicarious “donors.”  Charitable exemptions are 
justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public 
benefit—a benefit which the society or the community may not 
itself choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and 
advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax 
revenues.
93
 
It has been suggested that one reason for the government subsidy that 
results from the tax exemption is that charitable organizations perform 
functions that otherwise would fall on the government.
94
 
Nonprofits that qualify for IRC section 501(c) tax-exempt status must 
adhere to the federal tax code and IRS requirements for continued 
eligibility.  The ultimate penalty for noncompliance is the loss of tax-
exempt status.
95
  The IRS enhancements to Form 990 that are discussed 
below were designed to shed more light on nonprofit operations with a 
view to determining continued eligibility for tax exempt status. 
The enhanced disclosure requirements in IRS Form 990 for tax years 
starting in 2008 were aimed at corporate governance.
96
  These changes are 
it may not attempt to influence legislation as a substantial part of its activities 
and it may not participate in any campaign activity for or against political 
candidates. 
Exemption Requirements—Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, IRS (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=96099,00.html. 
93. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591.
94. See, e.g., Provena Covenant Med. Ctr., 925 N.E.2d at 1148. (“Conditioning
charitable status on whether an activity helps relieve the burdens on government is 
appropriate.”); see also HOPKINS, supra note 87 (stating that “[t]ax-exemption . . . relieves 
some burden that would otherwise fall to federal, state, or local government”). 
95. Some of these failures are reported in the popular press.  See, e.g., Isabel Vincent &
Melissa Klein, ‘All My Children’ Actor Doesn’t Know What Happened to Money Raised for 
9/11 Victims, NEW YORK POST (July 3, 2011, 9:22 AM), http://www. 
nypost.com/p/news/local/soap_star_in_vani_act_Io82alf3cGwlnHwt5NOaIL (noting that a 
charity to benefit 9/11 victims that was not properly organized but nevertheless raised 
money lost its tax exempt status). 
96. Grace Allison, The New Form 990 for Tax Exempt Organizations: Revolution in
Progress, 37 ESTATE PLANNING 14 (Mar. 2010) (discussing the new Form 990 
requirements); James J. Fishman, Stealth Preemption: The IRS’s Nonprofit Governance 
Initiative, 29 VA. TAX L. REV. 545 (2010) (same); James R. King, Travis F. Jackson, Gerald 
M. Griffith & Daniel J. Bacastow, Form 990 Disclosure Requirements Challenge Hospitals,
Provide Opportunities, 21 THE HEALTH LAWYER, Feb. 2009, at 1 (same).  Cf. Rummana
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consistent with more general increased concern over high executive 
compensation
97
 and other wasteful nonprofit expenditures.
98
  In particular, 
the Form 990 disclosures relating to board involvement in nonprofit 
governance were designed to increase transparency and accountability of 
nonprofit boards.
99
  The Form 990 filing was amended to add a category of 
all “key employees” whose names and compensation must be disclosed.100  
Most importantly, the 2008 enhancements to Form 990 require the 
nonprofit to answer a number of questions.  The Form 990 must indicate 
whether the organization provided a copy of the 990 (including all required 
schedules) to each voting member of the governing body prior to filing 
with the IRS.
101
  The Form 990 must also describe the process by which the 
officers, directors, trustees, or management reviewed the form, whether the 
form was reviewed before it was filed with the IRS, who conducted the 
review, when it was conducted, and the extent of the review.
102
 
A number of the questions in Form 990 are designed to address 
governance practices in setting executive compensation.  In particular the 
Alam, Note, Not What the Doctors Ordered: Nonprofit Hospitals and the New Corporate 
Governance Requirements of the Form 990, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 229 (2011) (arguing that 
the IRS reforms are too burdensome); Karen Donnelly, Note, Good Governance: Has the 
IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of 
Transparency and Accountability?, 79 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 163 (2010) (criticizing the IRS 
expansion of Form 990 as an unfortunate intrusion on corporate governance and the 
business judgment rule). 
97. See, e.g., Spitzer v. Grasso, 816 N.Y.S.2d 863, 877 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (denying
defendant nonprofit CEO’s motion to dismiss challenges to executive compensation as 
excessive), rev’d, 893 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008); Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 
269, 273 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (upholding attorney general’s complaint seeking to hold 
directors accountable for excessive compensation and mismanagement of university’s 
assets); Milton Cerny, Michelle A. W. McKinnon, Jeffrey R. Capwell & Kelly L. Hellmuth, 
New Scrutiny Of College and University Executive Compensation and Unrelated Business 
Activity, 37 J.C. & U.L. 93 (2010) (discussing increased IRS scrutiny of compensation). 
98. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, The Wisdom of Crowds? Groupthink and Nonprofit
Governance, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1179 (2010) (calling for reinforced fiduciary duties and 
enhanced limitations on self-dealing and conflicts of interest); Evelyn A. Lewis, Charitable 
Waste: Consideration of a “Waste Not, Want Not” Tax, 30 VA. TAX REV. 39 (2010) (calling 
for tax on excess payments rather than a prohibition on such payments).  Cf. John F. 
Coverdale, Legislating in the Dark: How Congress Regulates Tax-Exempt Organizations in 
Ignorance, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 809 (2010) (criticizing 2006 reforms aimed at donor-advised 
funds). 
99. The new Form 990 was implemented by Treasury Department release T.D. 9423,
published in the Federal Register at 73 Fed. Reg. 52527 (2008) and embodied in the 
Treasury Regs. 26 C.F.R. 1.6033-2T. 
100. “Key Employees” are defined in T.D. 9423 and on Form 990 as those making over
$150,000. 
101. IRS Form 990 Part VI, Section B, Question 11(a) and (b); Instructions for Form
990. 
102. Id.
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Form 990 must disclose the number and list independent voting members 
on the governing body.
103
  The Form 990 must state whether the nonprofit 
has a written conflict-of-interest policy.
104
  The Form 990 must also 
disclose whether the nonprofit’s officers, directors/trustees, and key 
employees are required to disclose annually interests that could give rise to 
conflicts.
105
  The Form 990 must indicate whether the nonprofit 
contemporaneously documents meetings of the board and its committees.
106
  
The Form 990 must also indicate whether the process for determining the 
compensation for the CEO, key officers and key employees included a 
review and approval by independent persons, consideration of 
compensation data for comparable positions at similar organizations, and 
contemporaneous documentation of deliberations and decisions regarding 
compensation.
107
 
The ultimate Internal Revenue Code sanction for excessive 
compensation or self-dealing can be loss of tax-exempt status.
108
  Treasury 
103. A board member is deemed “independent” if three specific conditions are satisfied
throughout the organization’s tax year:  1. The board member was not a compensated 
employee of the organization or of a related organization; 2. The board member did not 
receive total annual compensation or other payments in excess of $10,000 as an independent 
contractor (other than reimbursement of expenses under an expense reimbursement 
procedure) or reasonable compensation for services provided as a member of the board; and 
3. Neither the board member, nor any family member of the board member, was involved in
an “interested persons” transaction reportable on Schedule L. IRS Form 990 Part IV,
Question 25a.  “Interested Persons” include current and former officers, directors/trustees,
key employees and the five highest compensated employees).  Reportable transactions with
interested persons now include excess benefit transactions; loans, grants or assistance; and
business transactions that exceed specified thresholds.  IRS Form 990; see also, e.g.,
Kathleen M. Boozang, Does an Independent Board Improve Nonprofit Governance?, 75
TENN. L. REV. 83 (2007) (arguing that the “ongoing move toward board and director
independence in the nonprofit sector appears to be a movement without a clear goal,
supported by little evidence that independence has accomplished improvements in the
business sector”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Independence in the Independent Sector,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795 (2007) (discussing independent directors in the context of
nonprofit organizations).
104. IRS Form 990 Part VI, Section B, Question 12a.
105. Id. at Question 12b.
106. Id. at Question 8(a) and (b).
107. Id. at Question 15(a) and (b).  Affirmative responses will allow the nonprofit to
qualify for the rebuttable presumption that the compensation is reasonable.  Treas. Reg. § 
53.4958-6 (2002). 
108. Under I.R.C. § 4958 (2011), a violation of section 501(c)(3)’s language against
private inurement can result either in an excess-benefit tax or in revocation of tax-exempt 
status.  Prior to 1996, violation of the private inurement clause was limited to revocation of 
tax-exempt status.  With the enactment of section 4958 in 1996, a new middle ground was 
created where “intermediate sanctions” could be applied solely to persons involved in the 
excess benefit transaction rather than full revocation of exempt status.  I.R.C. § 4958 (2011). 
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Regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-1(F)(2)(ii) sets forth factors to be 
considered in deciding the appropriate remedy for abuse of charitable tax-
exempt status.
109
  Mitigating factors include safeguards or oversight 
procedures instituted by the nonprofit to protect against excessive 
compensation or self-dealing.
110
 
The absence of appropriate internal controls can thus have dire 
consequences for the organization.  For example, the IRS has cited the lack 
of internal controls, the board’s failure to question the organization’s use of 
funds, and the lack of internal safeguards against excess benefit 
transactions as contrary to Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(F)’s 
guidelines and thus grounds for revoking tax-exempt status.
111
  In this 
instance, as pointed out by the IRS, the board’s failure to notice or inquire 
about a manager’s self-dealing was problematic.112  Also of concern was 
the failure to have documentation for loans made to the organization’s 
manager.
113
  In revoking exemption, the government referred to Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(F)’s “safeguards” and “correction measures” as the “killer”
factors in determining the appropriateness of revocation.
114
  The ruling also
noted that internal controls and safeguards weigh most heavily against
revocation only when preliminary steps for correction have begun before
the IRS becomes aware of the situation.  Thus, it appears that safeguards
and internal controls are an important preventative measure for nonprofit
109. Enacted in 2008, Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1–(F)(2)(ii) provides guidelines for
deciding the appropriate penalty.  Briefly, those guidelines look to size, scope, frequency, 
prevention measures, and correction measures taken with respect to the transaction.  The 
prevention measures are outlined in paragraph D.  Id. 
110. Id.  See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201113041 (Jan. 7, 2011), at 13.32 (“[s]ufficient
safeguards have not been put in place to prevent future violations . . .”). 
111. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201029035 (Apr. 2, 2010), at 14.
112. The manager had used the organization’s funds for a multitude of personal expenses
and was never questioned by her board, which was described as composed of “‘yes’ 
people.”  Id. 
113. Id.; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2010150145 (Jan. 8, 2010), at 8 (revoking
exemption because the organization gave money to its director, who labeled it a “loan”). 
The ruling spent a good deal of time discussing the failures in oversight that help make this 
transaction illegitimate: 
Moreover, there is no credible evidence that the terms of the “loans” to FN were 
considered by the entire board of directors  . . . or that the purported loans were 
reviewed by anyone acting in the interests of charity.  Although FN have 
provided the Internal Revenue Service with a statement . . . stating the Board 
approved the loans when the Foundation was formed, this approval is not 
documented in any minutes of the Board.  There is also no evidence that the 
Foundation made any attempts at collection when FN failed to repay the “loans” 
according to their purported terms. 
Id. 
114. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201029035, 2010 PLR LEXIS 809, at 25 (Apr. 2, 2010).
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boards.  In addition, in a close case, documentation of board involvement is 
an important factor in determining whether benefits were excessive.
115
 
The excessive benefits need not be the result of intentional 
wrongdoing since it is the size of the benefit that counts.
116
  The IRS has 
indicated the type of remedial steps that could help restore tax-exempt 
status for an organization that had excessive private inurements.  A key 
preventative measure in this regard is an unbiased independent board
117
 
having proper procedures in place.
118
 
115. See, e.g., Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1202
(Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1970) (noting that the organization could not 
produce any documents evidencing the indebtedness and concluding that the church had 
failed to meet its burden of proof that a part of the corporate earnings was not a source of 
benefit to private individuals); Ramses Sch. v. Comm’r, 93 T.C.M. 1092, *31–32 (2007) 
(holding that the lack of documented minutes for board discussions regarding a questionable 
lease naturally failed to satisfy the burden); Rev. Rul. 59-95, 1959-1 C.B. 627 (observing 
that failure to document transactions resulted in revocation); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
201029035, supra note 111 (noting that lack of documentation weighed in favor of 
revocation of tax exempt status). 
116. For example, ordinarily compensation that is based on the organization’s profits or
revenue is improper.  Except for profit-sharing arrangements meeting the requirements in 
I.R.C. § 401, the general rule is that compensation for an individual cannot be based on the
corporation’s earnings without some kind of cap or restraint.  To do so would be to inure
earnings to private benefit.  In the most obvious case, an executive sets his compensation to
simply match a percentage of the corporation’s net profits for that year.  Gemological Inst.
of Am., Inc. v. Riddell, 149 F. Supp. 128, 130 (S.D. Cal. 1957) (refusing to accept the
argument that a particular compensation is not part of net earnings simply because it is
merely measured by the amount of those earnings).  The court in Riddell echoed the
proposition in People of God Cmty. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 75 T.C. 127, 132
(1980), that no matter what a person’s services are worth, they are not directly related to the
organization’s gross receipts that include charitable contributions.  Cf. Birmingham Bus.
Coll., Inc. v. Comm’r, 276 F.2d 476, 480 (5th Cir. 1960) (refraining from distributing profits
during lean years does not counteract such actions taken during better times).
117. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201113041, supra note 110 (noting the importance of
an independent board).  The IRS has indicated that “how” the organization is governed is a 
factor in determining if the organization is primarily conducting exempt activities.  I.R.S. 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200851024 (Aug. 5, 2008) (“Therefore, we find that the governance of ORG, 
in composition and in their (lack of) actions, is a factor highly in favor of ORG not 
operating primarily to further education within the meaning of 501(c)(3).”). 
118. The type of controls that the IRS is looking for is illustrated by the following
statement of what could be done to reinstate tax exempt status for an organization that had it 
revoked: 
Once the President has employed his best efforts to populate the Board with 
additional members unrelated to him; has resigned from the Board after doing 
so; has found competent financial help; has adopted a conflict of interest policy; 
and has attended educational symposia to improve his management skills . . . 
the new organization could then reapply for exemption. 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201113041, supra note 110, at 13.
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In addition to having an impact on IRS sanctions in the case of 
excessive benefits, proper procedures and board oversight can be important 
in avoiding a finding of excess benefits in close cases.  Code section 4958 
and its accompanying Regulation 53.4958-6 provide that payments under a 
compensation arrangement are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of 
reasonableness (meaning they are not excess benefit transactions and do 
not violate private inurement) when the following three elements are met: 
(1) a disinterested body of the organization, (2) relies on comparable data
and (3) properly documents the basis for the decision.
119
  Thus, obtaining
such a presumption for an individual’s compensation would require proper
oversight actions by other members of the organization.
120
  The lack of
proper oversight procedures may even raise an inference that the board at
least tacitly approved of the improper benefits.
121
  For example, lack of
conflict of interest protections in approving expense reimbursements has
led to imposition of IRS sanctions.
122
119. I.R.C. § 4958 (2011); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002).
120. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 provides that an authorized body has appropriate data as to
comparability if, given the knowledge and expertise of its members, it has information 
sufficient to determine whether the property transfer or compensation is at fair market value.  
Where there was no evidence that the personnel committee had any particular knowledge or 
expertise in determining whether compensation paid to the chief executive officer of a large 
hospital system was reasonable, the government cites the lack of consideration of any 
compensation analysis, and states that the five-year-old analysis that was available would 
have been inadequate even if considered.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200244028 (June 21, 2002).  
The government listed several alternative comparisons that would have satisfied the 
comparability prong, such as “compensation levels paid by similarly situated organizations, 
the availability of similar services in M’s geographic area, compensation surveys compiled 
by independent firms or actual written offers from similar institutions competing for A or 
B’s services.”  Id. at 15. 
121. The board’s poor oversight abilities can suggest that the organization has been
operated primarily for non-exempt purposes.  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201113041, supra note 
110. One person ran the organization with a governing board consisting of that person, his
wife, and his father.  The IRS found that the board did not constitute an independent body,
and that this created an inherent conflict of interest when the board was placed in a position
to approve financial transactions involving other family members.  The IRS concluded that:
[t]he organization does not have a conflict of interest policy.  The records of the
organization evidenced the fact that operating under the control of one person or
a small, related group suggests that an organization operates primarily for non-
exempt private purposes, rather than exclusively for public purposes, which is
the basis for exemption of any 501(c)(3) organization.
Id. at 11. 
122. For example, in one private letter ruling the IRS stated “Due to a lack of oversight
in your organizational structure, incidents of conflict of interest are not addressed . . . . you 
have not proved that your net earnings would not inure to the benefit of private individuals, 
your board member and officer.”  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201108042 (Dec. 2, 2010), at 1442. 
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The absence of a good governance structure has in some cases led the 
IRS to conclude that the organization was not primarily pursuing charitable 
goals.
123
  It is noteworthy that the organization has the burden of 
establishing that it is operating for a proper charitable purpose.
124
  It is 
important to recognize that although it is part of a new enforcement 
initiative, the enhanced Form 990 did not create new law.  Even prior to 
enactment of the enhanced disclosure obligations, the IRS looked to the 
organization’s ability to provide documentation for transactions that it 
considered compensation in comparable organizations.
125
 
Notwithstanding the criticism in some circles that the enhanced Form 
990 is an unwarranted intrusion into charitable operations,
126
 the burdens 
imposed by the IRS are not excessive.  In the first instance, the Form 990 is 
merely providing enhanced disclosure to enable the IRS to enforce its 
preexisting rules for charitable organizations.  Disclosure has further 
ameliorative effects by shedding light on practices that may violate the 
home state’s governance rules and providing a basis for enforcement by the 
attorney general.  As Louis Brandeis astutely observed nearly a century 
ago, sunlight is the best disinfectant.
127  
Disclosure thus has a significant 
impact on conduct.
128
 
123. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200830028 (Apr. 28, 2008), at 6, wherein it was
noted that: 
  You have not adopted bylaws or provided specific information about the 
governance of your organization, nor have you adopted a conflict of interest 
policy.  In addition, you do not have any members outside of A’s family and no 
other organization exercises significant influence over you. 
  The structure of your organization indicates that it can be used to benefit 
private individuals, such as A and his family, and you lack safeguards that 
would help to prevent such use.  In addition, you have provided no evidence 
that the organization will not be used for the benefit of private individuals. 
Therefore, you have not met your burden to prove that you will be operated for 
public rather than private purposes. 
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., John Marshall Law Sch. v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 902, 35, 81–2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9514 (1981) (upholding denial of tax-exempt status for past tax years and 
noting that “[p]erhaps the most significant factor in passing upon the reasonableness of 
compensation in a tax case is a comparison between the compensation that is under 
consideration and the prevailing rates of compensation paid to the holders of comparable 
positions by comparable companies within the same industry.”) (quoting Jones Bros. 
Bakery, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.2d 1282, 1291 (1969)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
126. See, e.g., Karen Donnelly, Note, Good Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the
Business Judgment of Tax-Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and 
Accountability?,  79 U.M.K.C L. REV. 163 (2010) (criticizing the IRS policy). 
127. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62
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Apart from compensation issues, tax-exempt status can be 
compromised by partnering with for-profit operations.
129
  For example, in 
the context of a joint venture with an organization, it is crucial that the 
nonprofit have control over the enterprise.
130
  Nonprofit parent-subsidiary 
relationships also raise questions about establishing proper governance 
structures for the affiliated corporations.
131
  Corporate governance can be 
an important factor in determining whether to treat separate entities as a 
single entity for the purpose of determining tax-exempt status.
132
  For 
(Richard M. Abrams ed., 1914) (“[S]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman.”). 
128. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1222 (1999) (noting that Felix 
Frankfurter agreed and, for example, “wrote an article in Fortune magazine about the 
anticipated social and financial effects of the [Securities] Act.  Frankfurter was quite explicit 
that the purpose of disclosure was to affect the behavior of corporate managers, bankers, and 
accountants.”).  For discussion of the federal securities laws’ focus on disclosure as 
effecting conduct, see THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 1.2 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the history, scope and coverage of state and 
federal securities laws). 
129. See, e.g., Linda M. Lampkin, IRS Increases Enforcement Focus on Nonprofit
Executive Compensation, GUIDESTAR.COM, http://www2.guidestar.org/rxa/news/articles/ 
2007/irs-increases-enforcement-focus-on-nonprofit-executive-compensation.aspx?articleId 
=1111 (Feb. 2007) (noting how IRS identifies non-profits for increased scrutiny of 
executive compensation and how non-profits can avoid problems arising out of executive 
compensation). 
130. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718. (listing several incriminating oversight
failures, including the following:  that the exempt organization does not have a majority 
voice on the board of the joint venture; that the management company and the officers are 
related to the for-profit partner; and that the management company has discretion to enter 
into all but “unusually large” contracts without board approval, including extension of their 
management contract). 
131. Proper governance of subsidiaries by parent non-profits is important to a
subsidiary’s tax-exempt status.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200204040 (Oct. 30, 2001) 
(“X’s [subsidiary’s] making of grants to organizations other than Y [parent] does not violate 
the 509(a)(3) [private foundation] operational test where, as here, Y’s board may disapprove 
any such grant—such procedure is substantially similar to the making of grants to Y.”).  
Also, in determining whether the parent in fact controls the subsidiary, the IRS looks to the 
parent’s “manner of exercising voting rights with respect to stocks in which members of its 
governing body also have some interest.”  Id. at 6. 
132. For example, IRS Regulation 1.170A-9(e)(11) provides rules for determining
whether a trust or funds may be treated as component parts of a community trust, to meet 
the requirements for classification as a “publicly supported” organization under section 
170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Code.  If the requirements of section 1.170A-9(e)(11) are met, the 
community trust will be treated as a single entity, and its separate funds as component parts 
of that entity for purposes of sections 170, 501, 507, 508, 509 and chapter 42 of the Code. 
The relevant requirements include: 
The organization must have a common governing body that either directs, or in 
the case of a fund designated for specific beneficiaries, monitors the distribution 
of all funds exclusively for charitable purposes.  (section 1.170A-9(e)(11)(v)). 
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example, corporate governance has been an important factor in examining 
the relationship between a foundation and the entity or entities that it 
supports.
133
 
It is clear that inadequate board oversight of a nonprofit’s grant-
making decisions can also be a contributing factor in loss of tax exempt 
status.
134
  Thus, it is critical for non-profit corporate boards and 
The governing body must have the following powers:  (section 1.170A-
9(e)(11)(v)(B))  
. . . 
The governing body must commit itself to obtain information and take 
appropriate steps to ensure that each trustee administers the trusts or funds 
under its control according to each individual governing instrument and 
accepted standards of fiduciary conduct to produce a reasonable return of net 
income.  The governing body’s responsibility extends both to individual trusts 
or funds, and the aggregate of trusts or funds, held by each trustee.  (section 
1.170A-9(e)(11)(v)(F)). 
The organization must prepare periodic financial reports treating all the funds it 
holds, either directly or as component parts, as its funds.  (section 1.170A-
9(e)(11)(vi). 
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200114039, 2001 PLR LEXIS 22, at 7–9 (Jan. 5, 2001).  The IRS goes
on to require that the Board of Directors shall monitor all activities of the corporation, and
that the corporation must prepare periodic financial reports regarding all the funds which
will be held by the Corporation as funds of the organization.  Id. at 13.
133. Section 509(a)(3) sets forth a relationship test between the supporting and the
supported organization which requires, as set forth in Regulation 1.509(a)-4(f)(2), one of 
three permissible relationships:  (i) operated, supervised, or controlled by; (ii) supervised or 
controlled in connection with; and (iii) operated in connection with one or more publicly 
supported organizations.  Addressing the first type of relationship above, the IRS noted that 
such relationship is satisfied where “a majority of the officers, directors, or trustees of the 
supporting organization are appointed or elected by the governing body . . . of the publicly 
supported organization.”  I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200946065 (Aug. 17, 2009), at 16. 
Regarding the second type of relationship mentioned above, such relationship exists where 
“there is common supervision or control by the persons supervising or controlling both the 
supporting and the publicly supported organizations, i.e., that control or management of the 
supporting organization is vested in the same persons . . . .”  Id.  Essentially, the board of the 
supported organization must either appoint or supervise/control the board of the supporting 
organization in order for it to be considered a supporting organization.  For a discussion of 
the third type of relationship mentioned above, see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201019034 (May 
14, 2009), which requires that the board member appointed by the supported organization 
have a significant voice in the operations of the supporting organization. 
134. For example, in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201113036 (Jan. 7, 2011), the IRS noted that
“[t]here is no evidence of any discussion relating to applications filed by potential grantees; 
no discussion of how grantees are going to use the funds; and no evidence that Company 
conducted investigations of potential grantees.”  The letter then concludes that the level of 
control exercised over the grant-making program was not “appropriate,” and that absent 
such appropriate control “[a]pplicant’s grant-making program operates as a conduit to direct 
charitable donations to non-501(c)(3) organizations . . . . [and,] [t]herefore, Applicant is not 
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management to exercise good oversight of their charitable donation (or 
grant-making) arms, lest they help the wrong people and lose their 
exemptions.
135
 
Following the pattern of for-profit corporations,
136
 the law relating to 
nonprofit corporation formation and organization is determined by the state 
of incorporation.
137
  As is the case with for-profit corporations, the most 
prominently referenced duties of nonprofit directors are the duties of care, 
good faith, and loyalty.  The discussion that follows addresses the duties of 
care (including good faith), loyalty, and obedience. 
VI. DUTY OF CARE
The duty care for business corporation directors developed as a matter 
of case law
138
 and has since been codified in most business corporation 
acts.
139
  The duty of care includes obligations of keeping informed, 
remaining attentive, and acting in a manner that the director reasonably 
believes is in the best interest of the corporation.
140
  Previously, the law 
phrased the obligation more in terms of a reasonable person standard so as 
to judge care according to a reasonable director under like circumstances.
141
  
Today most statutes speak in terms of a reasonable belief that the director is 
acting in the best interests of the corporation.
142
  This change in language 
may be more semantic than substantive since both are objective tests based 
on reasonableness and are not limited to the director’s subjective good 
faith belief.  The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act retained the prudent 
person standard until 2008 when it was redrafted to speak in terms of the 
director’s good faith belief of acting in the corporation’s best interest.143  
operated for tax-exempt purposes . . . .”  Id. at 10. 
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Directors’ Accountability: The Race to the
Bottom—The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171 (1987) (noting that choice of law is 
determined by the state of incorporation). 
137. See, e.g., Garry W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and Reform of
Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1113 (2007) (discussing incorporation of nonprofit 
organizations). 
138. See, e.g., Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524 (1920) (noting that directors oversee the
operations but are not held directly accountable for day to day management); Hun v. Cary, 
82 N.Y. 65 (1880) (holding that a corporate director must act in the same manner as a 
reasonable person in managing his or her own affairs). 
139. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2011) (discussing directors’ standard of
conduct). 
140. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, §§ 10:1, 10:3.
141. Id. § 10:3.
142. Id.
143. The comments to the 2008 version of the Model Nonprofit Act explain the change
as follows: 
376 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:2 
Many state statutes retain the reasonable person standard.
144
  In addition, 
the American Law Institute’s draft Principles of Nonprofit Law retains the 
reasonable person language that sounds more like a traditional negligence 
standard.
145
 
Business corporation directors’ duty of care is eased to some extent as 
it is qualified by the business judgment rule that was developed in case 
law.
146
  The business judgment rule in essence allows the directors to make 
what turn out to be bad decisions since courts do not view their role as 
second-guessing the business community with respect to business 
In the prior version of the act the duty of care element was included in 
subsection (a), with text reading:  “[a] director shall discharge his duties . . . 
with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise 
under similar circumstances.”  The use of the phrase “ordinarily prudent 
person” in a basic guideline for director conduct, suggesting caution or 
circumspection vis-à-vis danger or risk, has long been problematic given the 
fact that risk-taking decisions are central to the directors’ role.  When coupled 
with the exercise of “care,” the prior text had a familiar resonance long 
associated with the field of tort law.  See the Official Comment to Section 8.31.  
The further coupling with the verb “shall discharge” added to the inference that 
former Section 8.30(a)’s standard of conduct involved a negligence standard, 
with resultant confusion.  In order to facilitate its understanding, and analysis, 
independent of the other general standards of conduct for directors, the duty of 
care element has been set forth as a separate standard of conduct in subsection 
(b). 
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT—Official Text with Official Comments and Statutory Cross-
References § 8.30 (3d ed. 2008). 
144. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a)(2011) (“A director shall perform the duties of
a director . . . in a manner that director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation 
and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would use under similar circumstances.”); MINN. STAT. § 317A.251 (2011) (“A 
director shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in a manner the 
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care 
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A–8–30 (1994) (a director must act “(1) In good 
faith; (2) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and (3) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation.”). 
145. With respect to nonprofit directors, the American Law Institute’s draft Principles of
Nonprofit Law provides: 
The duty of care requires each governing-board member— 
(a) to become appropriately informed about issues requiring
consideration, and to devote appropriate attention to oversight; and
(b) to act with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably 
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.
ALI NONPROFIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 37, § 315. 
146. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, § 10:2.
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decisions.
147
  The business judgment rule is conditioned on the directors’ 
informing themselves and uninformed directors will not get the rule’s 
protection.
148
 
The American Law Institute’s draft Principles of the Law of Nonprofit 
Organizations reflects the general understanding that the duty of care 
consists of a combination of a duty to be informed and then act in a manner 
consistent with a reasonably prudent director under like circumstances.
149
 
As discussed below, there are limitations on liability for due care 
violations.  However, even in the absence of clear liability, nonprofit 
directors should be motivated to live up to their statutory responsibilities.  
For example, there is some evidence that when a nonprofit board is 
populated with large donors, there is greater efficiency in monitoring 
management’s activities.150  There is some evidence that this can result in 
147. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780–81 (1968) (refusing to second-
guess the directors’ judgment not to install lights in Wrigley Field even though every other 
major league baseball team played night games and revenues for weekday night games were 
higher than day games). 
148. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (1985) (holding that directors of for-
profit corporation could be held accountable for approving sale of company without using 
due diligence); see also Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 772 F. Supp. 2d 20, 
103–04 (D.D.C. 2011) (acknowledging the application of the business judgment rule to 
nonprofit directors but not where the directors have an actual or potential conflict of 
interest). 
149. ALI NONPROFIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 37, § 315.
150. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Callen, April Klein & Daniel Tinkelman, Board Composition,
Committees, and Organizational Efficiency: The Case of Nonprofits, 32 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 493 (2003) (finding a significant statistical association between the 
presence of major donors on the board and indicators of organizational efficiency.  Although 
causation was not demonstrated conclusively, the findings are consistent with the suggestion 
that that major donors are likely to monitor nonprofit organizations at least in part through 
their board membership); see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &  ECON. 301, 301–02 (1983) (contending “that separation 
of decision and risk-bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the 
benefits of specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective 
common approach to controlling the agency problems caused by separation of decision and 
risk-bearing functions”).  The Callen, Klein & Tinkelman article’s analysis indicates that the 
ratio of total expenses to program expenses is significantly and negatively associated with 
higher donor representation.  For example, the number of major donors on the finance 
committee that oversees budgets and administrative expenses correlates inversely with the 
nonprofit’s administrative expenses.  Callen, Klein & Tinkelman, supra note 150.  
However, having major donors on other committees does not show a statistically significant 
correlation with nonprofit efficiency.  Id.; see also Eddy Cardinaels, Governance in Not-for-
profit Hospitals: Effects of Board Members’ Remuneration and Expertise on CEO 
Compensation, 93 HEALTH POL’Y, 64–75 (Nov. 2009) (“The findings suggest that 
supervisory boards are more effective in controlling agency problems (i.e., aligning CEO 
pay to economic conditions) when their members have more expertise, but at the same time 
that the monitoring function is hampered when supervisory board members receive a large 
(excessive) remuneration.”). 
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positive outcomes when balanced by management representation on the 
board.
151
  Although having management on nonprofit boards can have 
positive benefits, the presence of management does not eliminate the need 
and, if anything, increases the need for independent oversight.
152
 
A separate topic in itself, and thus one not addressed by this article, is 
a director’s or trustee’s obligations with respect to investment and 
management of a charity’s assets.153  Investment decisions and the like are 
governed by prudent investment requirements.
154
 
While it is true that the volunteer nature of most nonprofit directors 
may be a factor in considering liability for mismanagement, it is not a 
complete bar.
155
  Thus, for example, where directors allowed foundation 
funds to sit in non-interest bearing accounts, the court found this to be a 
breach of duty.
156
  Directors also may be held accountable for allowing 
mismanagement of assets.
157
  It is generally accepted that mere negligence 
is not sufficient to hold a nonprofit director or officer accountable.
158
 
151. Edward A. Dyl, Howard L. Frant & Craig A. Stephenson, Governance and Funds
Allocation in United States Medical Research Charities, 16 FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY & MGMT. 
4 (Nov. 2000). 
152. See generally Eric W. Hayden, Governance Failures Also Occur in the Non-
Profit World, 2 INT’L J. OF BUS. GOVERNANCE & ETHICS 116 (2006) (stating that 
“governance suffers when boards are dominated by affiliated outsiders or when the 
allegiance of the board is not fully committed to the organisation’s mission and 
ongoing financial viability”). 
153. See, e.g., William Meade Fletcher, 6 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2603 (current through
2011) (noting “[g]enerally, charitable corporations . . . can hold property in trusts that are 
within the objects of their creation, and . . . may act as substitute trustee for another such 
corporation”) (internal citations omitted). 
154. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (2006) (outlining 
obligations of directors of institutional funds); see also Susan N. Gary, Is it Prudent to be 
Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities that Engage in Socially Responsible Investing 
and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 106 (2011) (discussing limits on prudent 
investing); Steven J. Riekes, Is the Law Causing Charities to Drown Because Their 
Endowment Funds Are Now Under Water?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 529 (2010) (discussing 
the ability to dip into the endowment during tough economic times); Peter Conti-Brown, 
Note, Scarcity Amidst Wealth: The Law, Finance, and Culture of Elite University 
Endowments in Financial Crisis, 63 STAN. L. REV. 699 (2011) (discussing restrictions on 
spending); Rachel M. Williams, Note, Transitioning from UMIFA to UPMIFA: How The 
Promulgation of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act Will Affect 
Donor-Initiated Lawsuits Brought Against Colleges and Universities, 37 J.C. & U.L. 201 
(2010) (discussing impact of prudent funds management law on donors’ suits). 
155. See discussion of qualified immunity for volunteers in the text accompanying notes
327–43 infra. 
156. Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 88 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
157. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998).
158. See, e.g., La. World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1989)
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Another area that falls within directors’ oversight is the manner in 
which nonprofits solicit funds.  Charitable solicitations are often governed 
by consumer (or donor) protection statutes.
159
  Discussion of those 
consumer protection issues go beyond the scope of this article. 
On occasion nonprofit hospitals convert into or are acquired by for-
profit entities.  In such a situation, the board is forsaking the nonprofit 
mission.  Acquisitions of nonprofit hospitals by for-profit companies have 
been challenged on the grounds that the sale was for less than fair value.
160
 
A. Business Judgment Rule
Although nonprofit corporations are not focused on business 
decisions, the business judgment rule is recognized in the nonprofit 
context.  For example, the ALI’s Principles of Nonprofit Law provides: 
A governing-board member who makes a business judgment in 
good faith satisfies § 315 (Duty of Care) if he or she: 
(a) is not interested, directly or indirectly, in the subject of
the business judgment and is otherwise able to exercise
independent judgment;
(b) is informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent he or she reasonably believes to be
appropriate under the circumstances; and
(c) reasonably believes that the business judgment is in the
best interests of the charity, in light of its stated purposes.
161
(holding that simple negligence alone by an officer or director of a non-profit corporation is 
insufficient for a finding of personal liability for that officer or director). 
159. See, e.g., 10 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 162.5–162.17 (West 2011) (stating the consumer
protection statute for Pennsylvania); see also Jamie Usry, Charitable Solicitation Regulation 
for the Nonprofit Sector: Paving the Regulatory Landscape for Future Success, CENTER FOR
PUBLIC POLICY & ADMINISTRATION, Policy Perspectives (July 30, 2008), 
http://www.imakenews.com/cppa/e_article001162331.cfm (summarizing charitable 
solicitation laws). 
160. See, e.g., Mary v. Lupin Found., 609 So.2d 184 (La. 1992) (allowing suit by
member and director of nonprofit challenging sale of nonprofit hospital to a for-profit 
company); see also Letter on behalf of Service Employees International Union to Michigan 
Attorney General Mike Cox (Sept. 27 2010), http://www.michigan.gov/documents 
/ag/SEIU_DMC_Letter_333733_7.pdf (urging state attorney general to challenge sale of 
nonprofit hospital to a for-profit corporation).  The challenged transaction was approved by 
the attorney general.  Press Release, Attorney General Bill Schuette, Cox Announces 
Approval for Sale of Detroit Medical Center to Vanguard (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,1607,7-164--247096--,00.html. Cf. German Corp. of 
Negaunee v. Negaunee German Aid Soc’y, 138 N.W. 343 (Mich. 1912) (holding that a sale 
of nonprofit’s assets was for less than fair value). 
161. ALI NONPROFIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 37, § 365 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 2007).
380 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:2 
Although not all observers agree that it is appropriate,
162
 the business 
judgment rule is a factor in assessing conduct of nonprofit directors.  A key 
point in this regard is the directors’ duty to be informed in making 
decisions. 
VII.  DUTY OF LOYALTY
The duty of loyalty is an important concept in both corporate law and 
the law of trusts.
163
  Among other things, the duty of loyalty addresses 
situations in which a director has a direct or indirect conflict of interest.
164
  
In its early stages, the rules relating to directors’ obligations of loyalty 
borrowed heavily from the strict rules governing trustees and agents.
165
  
The cases often classified corporate directors as trustees and subjected 
them to strict rules of disqualification of agents contracting with their 
principal.
166
  References to directors as trustees continue in current case 
law.
167
  Whereas the duty of care is often viewed as a matter of process, the 
162. See, e.g., Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect
Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (2003) (arguing that the current standard for 
nonprofit directors is too low and urging that courts should not apply the business judgment 
rule that developed to deal with for-profit corporations to insulate directors from liability for 
lack of due diligence). 
163. See, e.g., Melanie B. Leslie, Making Nonprofits Police Themselves: What Trust Law
Can Teach Us About Conflicts of Interest, 85 CHI-KENT L. REV. 551 (2010) (discussing the 
different standards of fiduciary duties in trust law and corporate law). 
164. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, §§ 10:11–10:19.
165. Id. § 10:11 (discussing the origins and development of the duty of loyalty).
166. See, e.g., Stack v. Welder, 31 P.2d 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (discussing the narrow
conditions in which a director of a corporation may deal directly with that corporation); N. 
Confidence Mining & Dev. Co. v. Fitch, 208 P. 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1922) (holding that a 
director with an adverse interest in the settlement of a claim could not vote on a resolution 
of the settlement); Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co., 191 A. 304, 318 (N.J. Ch. 1937) (detailing, 
among other things, the duties a trustee has to his beneficiaries), aff’d, 194 A. 65 (N.J. 
1937); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389–393 (1958) (stating the law of 
agency on the issues of adverse parties and conflicts of interest). 
167. On the general topic of determining the roots for corporate fiduciary obligations,
see Victor Brudey, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 
(1997) (proposing a modified contract-based account of a director’s fiduciary duty); 
Deborah A. DeMott, Breach Of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations Of Loyalty And 
Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006) (noting that duty arises from 
shareholders’ justifiable expectations of loyal conduct); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David 
Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 
(2005) (outlining the history and duties of corporate officers); Park McGinty, The Twilight 
of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic 
Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163 (1997) (arguing that shareholder protections from 
director self-interest are inadequate, and proposing various means that a stockholder can 
take to counter-balance director interests); Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous 
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duty of loyalty is more about substance, focusing on the director’s or 
officer’s motives, purposes, and goals.168 
The duty of loyalty, among other things, forbids many self-dealing 
contracts and transactions, which more generally are referred to as conflict-
of-interest transactions.  A director will not receive the benefit of the 
business judgment rule if acting out of self-interest and thus not serving the 
organization’s interests.169  An even more blatant form of loyalty breach 
arises when the officer or director has usurped a corporate opportunity.
170
  
Interestingly, in special instances, loyalty violations can even arise when 
the directors or officers are acting in their good faith belief that they are 
advancing the corporation’s interest.171  Duty of loyalty and potential 
conflict of interest situations place directors under a heightened duty of 
disclosure.
172
  For example, a director’s duty of loyalty arises when the 
director, even though financially disinterested, knowingly fails to warn 
other directors of material facts relevant to a transaction before the board.
173
 
Liasons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, And Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. 
REV. 651 (2002) (arguing that loyalty standards within corporate law are more nuanced than 
in the context of trusts reflecting their differing institutional settings); D. Gordon Smith, The 
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002) (crafting a 
unified theory of fiduciary duty as a “critical resource theory”); Lynn A. Stout, On The 
Proper Motives Of Corporate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want To Invite Homo 
Economicus To Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2003) (discussing the importance 
of altruistic behavior by board members).  For an early consideration of the same topic see 
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers
Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935).
168. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, § 10:11.
169. Id. § 10:02.
170. Id. § 11:8.
171. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988) (holding that even
though acting in the good faith belief they are serving the corporation’s interest, 
management must demonstrate a compelling justification for action taken for purpose of 
thwarting the on-going efforts of a stockholder to exercise its rights of corporate suffrage). 
172. See, e.g., Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918)
(discussing the duty of loyalty generally and, in particular, the need for full disclosure in 
conflict of interest transactions). 
173. See, e.g., Berkman v. Rust Craft Greeting Cards, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 787 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (noting that some of the directors failed to disclose to their fellow directors their 
knowledge that the investment banker whose fairness opinion the board would rely upon 
had a material financial interest in the outcome of the transaction); Ryan v. Gifford, 935 
A.2d 258 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing failure of director to report to fellow directors
knowledge that company had been defrauded).  In an early decision, a court asserted:
The trustee is free to stand aloof, while others act, if all is equitable and fair.  He 
cannot rid himself of the duty to warn and to denounce, if there is improvidence 
or oppression, either apparent on the surface, or lurking beneath the surface, but 
visible to his practised [sic] eye . . . There slumbered within these contracts a 
potency of profit which the plaintiff neither ignored in their making nor forgot 
in their enforcement. . . . [T]he refusal to vote does not nullify as of course an 
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Similarly, the duty of loyalty is implicated when a director actively assists 
another in misconduct harmful to the corporation.
174
 
Some very early American decisions adopted the inflexible English 
rule of disqualification whereby directors were forbidden to enter into 
contracts in which they have a personal interest that conflicts with their 
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation.
175
  The strict rule proved 
impracticable and the former rule gave way to the belief that there are 
commercial advantages to such transactions and that regulation, rather than 
strict prohibition, is the approach with the greatest social welfare.
176
  Case 
law often held that interested directors may not be counted toward the 
quorum necessary for the board to take action on the transaction in which 
the directors have an interest.
177
  However, director conflict of interest 
statutes generally provide that if a majority of disinterested directors 
approve the transaction, the approval is not conditioned on the disinterested 
directors satisfying the quorum requirement without counting the interested 
directors.
178
  Most states provide that a corporation’s contract with its 
director is not voidable if approved by a disinterested body of directors or 
stockholders, or if the contracting director or officer successfully bears the 
burden of showing the fairness of the transaction.
179
  As discussed below, 
influence and predominance exerted without a vote. 
Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric. Co., 121 N.E. at 380–81. 
174. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009) (illustrating an
example of such misconduct in which it was alleged that a vice-chairman assisted in 
concealment of fraudulent transactions designed to inflate corporation’s revenues). 
175. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, § 10:12.  Portions of the discussion that follows are
adapted from COX & HAZEN. 
176. 3 FLETCHER, supra note 153, § 931 (declining to follow the strict rule); 12 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1533 (3d ed. 1970); Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 
22 BUS. LAW. 35 (1966) (noting shift over time towards regulation and away from strict 
rule). 
177. See, e.g., Karris v. Water Tower Trust & Sav. Bank, 389 N.E.2d 1359 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979) (holding interested directors cannot be included in quorum); Am. Disc. Corp. v. 
Kaitz, 206 N.E.2d 156 (Mass. 1965) (same); Davis v. Heath Dev. Co., 558 P.2d 594 (Utah 
1976) (same); Rocket Mining Corp. v. Gill, 483 P.2d 897 (Utah 1971) (same). 
178. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (West 2011) (majority of disinterested
directors is sufficient even if less than a quorum); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.62(c) (2008) 
(“A majority (but no fewer than two) of all the qualified [disinterested] directors on the 
board of directors or on the committee, constitutes a quorum for purposes of action that 
complies with this section”). 
179. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) (requiring director to show good faith and
inherent fairness of transaction); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 
1984) (recognizing that after prima facie showing that director has self-interest in a 
transaction, the burden shifts to director to demonstrate fairness of transaction); see also 
Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int’l, 741 F.2d 707, 720 (5th Cir. 1984); Drobbin v. Nicolet 
Instrument Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bellis v. Thal, 373 F. Supp. 120 
2012] PUNCTILIOS AND NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 383 
this rule is now included in most corporation statutes.
180
  At least one 
commentator has suggested that a strict prohibition on self-dealing would 
be appropriate for nonprofit directors.
181
 
Nonprofit corporation law follows the same pattern as the business 
corporation law discussed above.
182
  Similarly, the conflict of interest rules 
for nonprofit corporations follow the pattern of business corporation acts.
183
  
Thus, a conflict of interest transaction is not voidable due to the 
relationship creating the conflict if the transaction is approved by a 
disinterested governing body or if it is proven to be fair to the 
corporation.
184
  In these situations, the burden of proving fairness clearly 
lies with the person trying to validate the conflict of interest transaction.  
(E.D. Pa. 1974), aff’d, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975); Am. Timber & Trading Co. v. 
Niedermeyer, 558 P.2d 1211 (Or. 1976); Sammis v. Stafford, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 589, 594 
(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1996) (holding that the defendant met the burden of establishing that the 
challenged transaction was “just and reasonable”). 
180. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (West 2011) (describing process for
avoiding voidability of conflict of interest transactions); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60–
8.63 (2008) (same). 
181. Leslie, supra note 52, at 1226:
The law should be restructured to support desirable social norms. Restructuring
the state law fiduciary duty of loyalty as a set of clear rules would best
accomplish this goal.  A flat prohibition on self-dealing and conflict of interest
transactions would be the most effective way to ensure that fiduciaries place the
best interests of the nonprofit ahead of self-interest.  The rule would be unlikely
to hurt nonprofits because board members who wish to help can structure
transactions to avoid conflict.  Short of that, clear rules that require investigation
of alternatives, deliberation, and proof that inside transactions are clearly below
market would do much to counter the damaging impact of groupthink.
182. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 330 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007);
see also Leslie, supra note 52 (calling for heightened rules on nonprofit conflict of interest 
transactions). 
183. See MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2008) (stating that for nonprofit
corporations a transaction or contract in which a director is an interested party is not thereby 
void or voidable). 
184. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 330 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007).
The draft Principles, which reflect current law, provide: 
The governing board may approve a transaction between the charity and a 
fiduciary, waive the charity’s interest in a transaction between another person 
and a fiduciary, or approve or waive any other conflict of interest of the 
fiduciary described in § 310(b) if in good faith the board reasonably determines 
that the transaction with the charity is both fair to and in the best interests of the 
charity, or that the approval or waiver of the charity’s interest in any other 
conduct is in the best interests of the charity. 
Id. § 330(a).  In addition, approval by a disinterested governing board or committee is 
conditioned upon the fiduciary having “made a good-faith disclosure to the decisionmaking 
body of all relevant material facts, and refrained from seeking to influence the 
decisionmaking process.”  Id. § 330(b)(1). 
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This rule is reflected in nonprofit corporation statutes.
185
  Strict prohibition 
is likely to prove as impracticable for nonprofit organizations as it has with 
for business corporations. 
Although not necessarily limited to self-dealing transactions, 
nonprofits must be mindful about not operating too much like a business 
entity that focuses on profits to its shareholders.  As noted earlier, the IRS 
polices nonprofits that abuse their charitable status by providing private 
rather than public benefits.
186
  The nonprofit corporation also can also be 
used to curtail abuses.  Blatant self-dealing will provide a basis for 
dissolution of a nonprofit corporation.
187
  Converting a public benefit 
nonprofit into a corporation focused on private benefits amounts to a 
185. See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2008):
(a) A contract or transaction between a nonprofit corporation and one or more
of its members, directors, members of a designated body, or officers or between
a nonprofit corporation and any other entity in which one or more of its
directors, members of a designated body, or officers are directors or officers,
hold a similar position, or have a financial interest, is not void or voidable solely
for that reason, or solely because the member, director, member of a designated
body, or officer is present at or participates in the meeting of the board of
directors that authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because his or
their votes are counted for that purpose, if:
(1) the material facts as to the relationship or interest and as to the
contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board of directors
and the board in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the
affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors even though
the disinterested directors are less than a quorum;
(2) the material facts as to the relationship or interest of the member,
director, or officer and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or
are known to the members entitled to vote thereon, if any, and the
contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of
those members; or
(3) the contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it
is authorized, approved, or ratified by the board of directors or the
members
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence
of a quorum at a meeting of the board that authorizes a contract or transaction
specified in subsection (a).
(c) This section is applicable except as otherwise restricted in the articles of
incorporation or bylaws.
See also CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233 (West 2011) (describing approval process for self-dealing 
transactions with nonprofit corporations); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55A-8-31 (West 2010) 
(containing provisions dealing with directors’ conflict of interest). 
186. I.R.C. § 501 (2011).
187. See Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Serv., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2002). 
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breach of fiduciary duty.
188
  Payments by a nonprofit to its officers that 
purport to be compensation implicate the board as these payments must be 
approved by the board.
189
  In addition to dissolution, the principals who 
take assets from a nonprofit may be held accountable and held liable in 
damages.
190
 
The corporate opportunity doctrine holds that a corporate fiduciary 
cannot take for his or her personal benefit an opportunity that should be 
offered to the corporation.
191
  The corporate opportunity doctrine applies to 
nonprofit corporation directors and managers.
192
 
VIII. GOOD FAITH (AN INDEPENDENT DUTY?)
There are frequent references in both cases and scholarship to a 
director’s duty of good faith as a third fiduciary duty193 in addition to the 
duties of care and loyalty.  Even if not viewed as a stand-alone duty, the 
obligation of good faith is subsumed in the duties of care and loyalty.  This 
is the better view.
194
  For example, the Delaware Supreme Court clarified 
188. Id. at 504 (“[A] director’s duty of loyalty lies in pursuing or ensuring pursuit of the
charitable purpose or public benefit which is the mission of the corporation.”). 
189. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998); State ex rel.
Little People’s Child Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Little People’s Child Dev. Ctr., Inc., No. M2007-
00345-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 103509, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009); see also People 
ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 816 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (denying defendant 
nonprofit CEO’s motion to dismiss challenges to executive compensation as excessive).  
However, on appeal, the New York Court of Appeals found no violation of the New York 
Nonprofit Corporation Act.  People v. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d 105 (2008) (dismissing claims). 
190. Little People’s Child Dev. Ctr., Inc., 2009 WL 103509; see also Mid-List Press v.
Nora, 275 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2003) (holding director and officer of nonprofit press 
violated fiduciary duty by misappropriating to himself trade name and ISBN numbers 
belonging to the nonprofit corporation). 
191. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, §§ 11:8–11:10.
192. See Valle v. N. Jersey Auto. Club, 359 A.2d 504 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976);
see also MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.70 (2008). 
193. See, e.g., Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business
Judgment Rule in Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1062 (2009) (discussing how good faith 
relates to directors’ duties under Delaware corporate law); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, R. Franklin Balotti & Jeffrey M. Gorris, Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining 
Role of Good Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 673 (2010) (discussing “the rise 
and demise of an independent duty of good faith”). 
194. RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW §
14.03 at 14–7 (7th ed. 2010) ( 
The requirement of good faith is listed separately in the statute and has 
occasionally been cited as a separate duty apart from the duties of due care and 
loyalty; but it normally operates more as a component of the other two 
traditional duties, requiring conscientious effort in discharging the duty of care 
and constituting the very core of the duty of loyalty. 
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that the duty of good faith is in essence a component of both the duty of 
care and the duty of loyalty.
195
  Good faith is also an important concept 
when dealing with statutes that permit limitation of liability for due care 
violations.
196
  The current version of the model nonprofit act permits 
provisions in the articles of incorporation limiting liability for actions by a 
disinterested director that are taken in good faith.
197
  The exculpation 
provision is not applicable to charitable organizations since their directors 
are already protected by a liability shield.
198
 
A director’s duty of good faith also includes disclosure obligations.  It 
has thus been said that nonprofit directors are subject to a duty of candor.
199
  
Whether good faith is viewed as a separate obligation is not truly 
significant in measuring directors’ duties.  Since good faith is clearly 
included in the duties of due care and loyalty, directors not acting in good 
faith should be held accountable.
IX. DUTY OF OBEDIENCE
In addition to the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith, courts and 
observers speak in terms of a director’s duty of obedience with respect to 
both business corporations and nonprofit corporations.
200
  The duty of 
obedience is especially significant in the case of nonprofit corporations.  
References to a duty of obedience capture the idea that a director is under 
an obligation to ensure that the corporation acts within its proper purpose 
) (internal citations omitted). 
195. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) ( 
[A]lthough good faith may be described colloquially as part of a “triad” of
fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty . . . [o]nly the latter
two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability . . . . 
(internal citation omitted).  The draft ALI Principles applicable to nonprofits discuss the 
history of good faith in Delaware corporate law as a guide to the meaning of good faith in 
the context of nonprofits.  PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 370 Reporter’s 
Note 15 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
196. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (1980) (permitting a clause in the
articles of incorporation limiting damages for due care violations). 
197. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(c) (2008).
198. Id. § 8.31(d).
199. See Armenian Assembly of Am., Inc. v. Cafesjian, 772 F. Supp. 2d 20, 113 (D.D.C.
2011).  This ruling echoes the well-established rule with respect to for-profit directors that a 
breach of duty does not result in liability absent proof of damages proximately caused by the 
breach.  See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (providing an illustration 
of the rule that a lawsuit brought on grounds of a director’s negligence must satisfy the 
element of proximate causation). 
200. See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 457 (2010/2011) (discussing the duty of obedience).
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and mission.  This obedience can also include honoring a donor’s intent in 
the administration of the organization’s assets. 
Older corporate law treatises and cases referred to a director’s duty of 
obedience.
201
  The directors’ duty of obedience receives some mention 
today
202
 but is not universally listed as it once was in corporate 
scholarship.
203
  It has been suggested that the duty of obedience should be 
revived.
204
  There is scattered case law throughout the United States 
referring to a director’s duty of obedience for both for-profit205 and 
201. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 62 (rev. ed. 1946).
The successor edition of the Ballantine edition explains that the duty of obedience is, in 
effect, the application of the ultra vires doctrine.  COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, § 10:1 at 
126–27.  The duty of obedience is referred to in a number of classic corporate law texts.  
E.g., I. MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN INCORPORATED 125–30 (1931) (
Directors owe a three-fold duty to the corporation.  First, they must be obedient. 
Second, they must be diligent.  Third, they must be loyal. 
As to obedience, they of course owe a duty to keep within the powers of the 
corporation as well as within those of the board of directors  
. . . 
With regard to diligence, the directors owe a duty to exercise reasonable care 
and prudence . . . . In no event is the idea to be tolerated that directors serve 
merely as brightly gilded ornaments of the corporate institution 
. . . . 
The third duty owing by directors is that of undivided loyalty. 
).  See also Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 719 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(recognizing duty of obedience as one of three duties arising from the fiduciary status of 
corporate directors). 
202. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, § 10:1 at 126–27; Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the
Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43 (2008) (suggesting that the duty of 
obedience is the pillar of traditional board duties of care and loyalty).  Cf. Megan 
Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforcing 
an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 68 BUS. LAW. 27 (2010) (suggesting increased focus on 
officers’ fiduciary duties and, in particular, the duty of obedience). 
203. Rob Atkinson, supra note 202, at 45 (2008) (stating that “both doctrinal and
theoretical [commentators] have come to agree that the fiduciary relationship rests on twin 
pillars, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty” and arguing that “a third duty, obedience, is 
more basic, the foundation on which the duties of care and loyalty ultimately rest.”); Peggy 
Sasso, Comment, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond 
The Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1485, 1528–29 (2003) 
(suggesting that “[t]he duty of obedience is a legacy of trust law that does not square with 
the [Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act’s] attempt to line up not-for-profit fiduciary 
duties with those of its for-profit counterpart.”). 
204. Palmiter, supra note 200; Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit
Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1677 (2009). 
205. For more on for-profit corporation cases referencing the duty of obedience, see
Wooley v. Lucksinger, 61 So.3d 507, 514 (La. 2011) (stating that “[t]hree broad duties stem 
from the fiduciary status of corporate officers and directors:  namely the duties of 
obedience, loyalty, and due care”), and Lundy v. Masson, 260 S.W.2d 482, 507 (Tex. App. 
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nonprofit corporations.
206
  Regardless of the label, it is significant whether 
the concepts behind what at least one commentator referred to as a “largely 
forgotten”207 duty of obedience are already ensconced as part of the existing 
law of nonprofit directors’ duties.  The duty of obedience is a reflection of 
the age-old ultra vires doctrine that prohibits corporate acts beyond the 
corporation’s mission and purpose.208  The same concept applies with 
nonprofit corporations.
209
  From a practical standpoint the duty of 
obedience can be seen as a substantive rather than process-oriented view of 
board obligations.
210
  Although case references to the duty of obedience 
Houston Dist. 14 2008).  Cf. Weinstein Enters., Inc. v. Orloff, 870 A.2d 499, 509 (Del. 
2005) (holding that when a parent corporation elects a subsidiary’s directors those directors 
do not owe a duty of obedience to the parent; duties are owed to the subsidiary); Deborah A. 
DeMott, The Mechanisms of Control, 13 CONN. J. INT’L L. 238, 253 (1999) (arguing that a 
subsidiary’s directors do not have a duty of obedience to the parent company).  But cf. Cent. 
Power Co-Op v. Consumers Energy, 741 N.W.2d 822 (table), 2007 WL 2710841 (Iowa 
App. 2007) (addressing only the duties of good faith and care although the complaint 
referenced a duty of obedience).  Most of the cases retrieved from a Westlaw search 
(director & corporation & “duty of obedience”) of the fifty state cases dealing with 
directors’ duty of obedience arose in Texas.  The same was true of a similar Westlaw search 
of federal cases which revealed fifty-seven cases, most of which did not deal with directors’ 
duties.  See, e.g., Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int’l., Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(referencing a director’s duty of obedience under Texas law); In re Hollis, 2011 WL 
1168403 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2011) (recognizing duty of obedience owed by director under 
Texas law). 
206. See Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding
that a nonprofit’s use of funds for medical clinics instead of operating a hospital breached 
the duty of obedience); Shorter Coll. v. Baptist Convention of Ga., 614 S.E.2d 37 (Ga. 
2005) (discussing nonprofit directors’ duty of obedience); People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 
831 N.Y.S.2d 349 (Table), 2006 WL 3016952 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 2006) (stating that 
“[f]iduciary duty actually includes three distinct duties:  duty of care, loyalty and obedience” 
and then discussing the duty of obedience while denying defendant nonprofit CEO’s motion 
to dismiss challenges to executive compensation as excessive), aff’d as modified sub nom, 
54 A.D.3d 180 (2008) (dismissing claims); Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 
715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (recognizing duty of obedience for directors of non-
profits).  Cf. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 2005) (discussing 
duty of obedience but rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to conversion of not-for-profit’s health 
plan to a for-profit plan). 
207. Palmiter supra note 200, at 458.
208. COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, ch. 4.
209. Carson v. Carson, 88 S.W. 175, 178 (Tenn. 1905) (stating that a “corporation
organized for charitable purposes has these purposes and trusts set out in its charter and 
articles of foundation . . . [b]ut no trusts in such case need be declared, as they are set out in 
the charter and articles of foundation”). 
210. Practitioners have described the duty as substantive.  See, e.g., David H. Robbins,
New Risks for Hospital Boards: Good Faith Decisions with Bad Outcomes, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE MAGAZINE (July 2006) (“[T]he duty of obedience tests the substantive, as 
opposed to the procedural, quality of decisions by nonprofit boards.”). 
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may be relatively rare, practicing lawyers clearly recognize its 
importance.
211
  The duty of obedience is also included in guidebooks for 
nonprofit directors.
212
  State attorneys general who have enforcement 
responsibilities regarding nonprofit corporations also recognize the 
significance of the duty of obedience in the nonprofit sector.
213
  Many 
charitable nonprofits have a limited mission statement and, if so, this would 
bear upon the board’s duty of obedience with respect to that mission.214  
Similarly, if there are donor restrictions on use of funds,
215
 the board needs 
211. Id.; see also, e.g., Board of Directors: Duty of Care. BENJAMIN P. FLAVIN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW (Apr. 14, 2011), http://benflavinlaw.com/law-blog/board-of-directors-
duty-of-care (“Each member of a board of directors of a corporation is charged with three 
duties:  the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty and the Duty of Obedience.”); James H. Freis 
and Erin K. Callahan, Responsibilities of Not for Profit Corporate Board Members, 
DRINKER BIDDLE (2002), http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/6e3918ff-618f-
4478-8536-f64c88db8871/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/012807b5-6324-4d54-b7ab-
abd075c19990/freis_nonprofit.pdf (including among responsibilities of not for profit 
corporate board members the duty of obedience); Memorandum from James P. Joseph, 
Fiduciary Duties of a Director and Conflicts of Interest, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP (May 8, 
2006) (including duty of obedience as a director duty). 
212. See, e.g., Business Law Section of The North Carolina Bar Association & N.C.
Center For Nonprofits, GUIDEBOOK FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS OF NORTH CAROLINA 
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 19, 26, 31 (2d ed. 2003) (referencing the duty of obedience). 
213. See, e.g., Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Charitable Organizations, OFFICE OF THE 
[MINN.] ATT’Y GEN. LORI SWANSON, http://www.ag.state.mn.us/charities/fiduciaryduties.asp 
(last visited June 22, 2011) (discussing nonprofit directors’ duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience); A Guide to Non-Profits, NEV. DEPT. OF JUSTICE—OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 9 
(2011) (including duty of obedience); Right From the Start—A Handbook for Not-For-
Profit Board Members, N.Y. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 7 (2009) (including the duty of 
obedience). 
214. See, e.g., Shorter C. v. Baptist Convention of Ga., 614 S.E.2d 37, 43 (Ga. 2005)
(quoting Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1999)) ( 
It is axiomatic that the board of directors [of a nonprofit] is charged with the 
duty to ensure that the mission of the charitable corporation is carried out.  This 
duty has been referred to as the “duty of obedience.”  It requires the director of 
a not-for-profit corporation to “be faithful to the purposes and goals of the 
organization,” since “[u]nlike business corporations, whose ultimate objective 
is to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined by their specific objectives 
. . . .” 
) (emphasis added).  The court held that the transfer of nonprofit college assets to a 
foundation did not constitute a valid dissolution of the non-profit corporation.  Id. 
215. See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, The Problems With Donor Intent: Interpretation,
Enforcement, and Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 977 (2010) (discussing 
problems in identifying donor intent); Carrie M. Lovelace & Jeffrey C. Sun, Commentary, 
Analyzing the Continuing Relationship Between Universities and Their Donors’ Successors, 
256 ED. L. REP. 513 (2010) (discussing the ability of donors’ successors to monitor and 
challenge use of funds); see also Michael J. Hussey, Avoiding Misuse of Donor Advised 
Funds, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 59 (2010) (discussing donor-advised funds). 
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to assure proper procedures are in place and that there is sufficient 
transparency to assure obedience to the donor’s restrictions.216  For 
example, in one case a group of trustees were allowed to challenge a 
change in the charity’s mission and to attempt to enforce the duty of 
obedience even though the state attorney general was not concerned since 
the funds were still being used for the public good.
217
  The trustees were 
thus allowed to try to enforce the duty of obedience even though the state 
attorney general’s charge under the statute is primarily to assure that the 
funds were being used for the public good. 
Charitable organizations that disburse donor funds have special 
obligations.  For example, failure to follow the donors’ intent can be 
problematic and form the basis for challenging the charity’s operations.218  
The charitable trust doctrine
219
 holds that, with restricted gifts, a donor’s 
216. Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs.
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2005) (discussing the stewardship of 
donor intent and noting:  “[t]he cat is out of the bag:  Donors are fast discovering what was 
once a well-kept secret in the philanthropic sector—that a gift to public charity donated for a 
specific purpose and restricted to that purpose is often used by the charity for its general 
operations or applied to other uses not intended by the donor”).  Cf. Reid Kress Weisbord, 
The Effects of Donor Standing on Philanthropy: Insights from the Psychology of Gift-
Giving, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 225 (2009) (discussing impact of donor control of management of 
funds and suggesting that giving donors standing to sue will not necessarily promote the 
public policy of the charity); Lisa Loftin, Note, Protecting the Charitable Investor: A 
Rationale for Donor Enforcement of Restricted Gifts, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 361 (1999) 
(discussing benefits of donor control over use of funds).    Just recently, a hospital was 
required to return a donor’s contribution and pay punitive damages for failure to follow the 
donor’s directions. See Hospital Must Pay Garth Brooks $1 Million, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/life/people/story/2012-01-24/garth-brooks-hospital-settlement 
/52783732/1 (Jan. 24, 2012). See also Ray Charles Foundation wants $3M Gift back From 
Ga. University, says arts Center Never Built, WASH. POST, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ray-charles-foundation-wants-3m-back-from-ga-
college-seeks-building-named-after-late-singer/2012/02/14/gIQAf8zEER_story.html (Feb. 
14, 2012) (discussing foundation’s attempt to recoup donation due to failure to follow 
donor’s intent). 
217. Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964).
The attorney general was not the exclusive party to bring suit.  Id. at 937.  The court allowed 
the plaintiff-trustees to bring suit challenging the change in name and mission of the 
foundation.  Id.  The attorney general had found that the name change was proper since the 
funds were still going towards the public good even though the plaintiff-trustees disagreed. 
Id. at 936; see also, Dana Brakman Reiser, Nonprofit Takeovers: Regulating the Market for 
Mission Control, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1181 (2006) (discussing attempts to change a charity’s 
mission). 
218. See, e.g., John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted
Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2010) (discussing difficulties that can arise 
in honoring donors’ intent with respect to restricted gifts); Gary, supra note 215 (same); see 
also Hussey, supra note 215 (same). 
219. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Charity Governance: What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?,
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intent creates trust obligations in managing the trust.
220
  The Board’s 
oversight functions can include having a reasonable basis for believing that 
donor intent is being honored.
221
  There has been a debate concerning the 
extent to which a charity should have to honor the so-called dead hand of a 
donor’s intent.222  The issues can be quite complex.  For example, is the 
donor’s intent no longer consistent with the foundation’s goals due to a 
change in circumstances?  Are there other reasons that a board may believe 
80 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 641, 642 (2005) (“When it comes to enforcing restrictions on gifts—
even those made to corporate charities—regulators and courts commonly apply charitable 
trust doctrines.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959) (stating that 
“[a] charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a 
manifestation of an intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is 
held to equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose”). 
220. See, e.g., Detroit Osteopathic Hosp. v. Johnson, 287 N.W. 466, 471 (Mich. 1939) (
There is no doubt that he and the other donors intended that the use of the
property and the contemplated activity of this corporation should be purely
eleemosynary and a contribution to the general welfare of the community, and
that it should be carried on in a manner not inconsistent with the articles of
association and the original by-laws. . . . [T]he original set-up is so clearly a
fundamental element of the plan of the original founders of this trust that it
should be protected and preserved by equity.  Especially is this true since
jurisdiction over the control and execution of trusts is in general vested in the
equity courts. . . . A material change in this provision of the by-laws should be
and is perpetually enjoined; and also for the reasons hereinbefore noted
defendants’ attempted amendment of article V of the articles of association
which would materially change the control and execution of this trust, should be
and is held to be invalid . . . . 
); see also, Healy v. Loomis Inst., 128 A. 774 (Conn. 1925) (holding trustees required to 
follow intent of the will); Hite v. Queen’s Hosp., 36 Haw. 250 (Haw. 1942) (approving of 
the charitable trust doctrine); John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of 
Restricted Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2010) (discussing donor intent). 
221. Nonprofit corporation acts allow the board to rely on management unless there have
been red flags that make reliance questionable.  MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(f) 
(2009).  It would be good practice for the board or an applicable committee to engage in 
some independent investigation to reassure themselves of their ability to rely on 
management. 
222. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum
of Charitable Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183 (2007) (referring to the debate over 
hundreds of years but focusing on the issue of donor standing to enforce donor intent); 
Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public is 
Private Philanthropy?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (2010) (noting tensions between donor 
intent and public interest); John K. Eason, The Restricted Gift Life Cycle, or What Comes 
Around Goes Around, 76 FORD. L. REV. 693, 694 (2007) (“The overriding issue is thus one 
of honoring donor intent.  As time passes after the inception of the gift, the issue is often 
less favorably characterized as one of enduring and potentially unwise dead-hand control.”); 
Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should not Cure Board 
Discretion over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 689 (2005) (discussing the possible tension between honoring donor intent and
fulfilling the goals and mission of the charity).
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that the donor’s intent should yield to the public good or the mission of the 
foundation?  On the other hand, adhering to donor intent is in the public 
interest to the extent it encourages charitable contributions.
223
  Even if the 
board can decide that the donor’s intent should yield to the charity’s 
general purpose, the board’s oversight obligation is implicated and they 
should assure transparency in the charity’s decisions. 
X. VOLUNTEER VERSUS COMPENSATED DIRECTORS
Directors of larger for-profit corporations generally are compensated 
for their board service.
224
  Although it is usually assumed that nonprofit 
directors are volunteers, this is not always the case.  For example, nonprofit 
health plans
225
 that in fact operate a business, albeit in a nonprofit form,
226
 
often compensate their governing board.  Even foundations with a truly 
charitable mission may compensate directors.  For example, a recent study 
223. Ilana H. Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The
Barnes Foundation and the Case for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of 
Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1747, 1767 (2003) ( 
Enforcement of donor provisions furthers the general public welfare insofar as it 
creates a donor-friendly environment, where donors can be confident their 
wishes will continue to be enforced. . . . [T]he policy . . . encourage[s] donors to 
continue to dedicate their fortunes to public purposes.  Public enforcement also 
benefits the donor by ensuring that his particularized vision . . .will endure. 
). 
224. According to a study by a corporate compensation consulting firm, median director
compensation in 2009 for the 100 largest companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange was $214,000.  2010 Director Compensation: NASDAQ 100 v. NYSE 100, 
FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC. 7 (2010).  Another survey of 250 mid-market public 
companies found that average board member compensation was $101,432.  The BDO 250, 
BDO SEIDMAN LLP 6 (2009). 
225. In 2009, Blue Plus compensated directors between $0 and $9500.  HMO Minnesota
(Blue Plus), IRS Form 990 Part VII, at 7 (2009) (http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs 
/hpsc/mcs/990s/990blue09.pdf).  Group Health Plan compensated directors between 
$15,000 and $31,750.  HealthPartners compensated directors between $11,250 and $31,750. 
Group Health Plan, Inc., IRS Form 990 Part VII, at 7 (2009) (http://www.health.state.mn.us 
/divs/hpsc/mcs/990s/990ghi09.pdf).  Medica compensated directors between $30,000 and 
$86,000 with an average more than double the aforementioned plans.  Medica Health Plans, 
IRS Form 990 Part VII, at 7 (2009) (http://www.health.state.mn.us 
/divs/hpsc/mcs/990s/990ghi09.pdf).  Blue Cross and Blue Shield of South Carolina 
compensated their directors between $99,158 and $158,086 in 2010.  Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield of South Carolina, Supplemental Compensation Exhibit at 460 
(http://media.charleston.net/2011/pdf/2010BCBSSC_Supplemental%20Comp.pdf). Board 
compensation at the company more than doubled between 2009 and 2010.  Id. 
226. See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text (regarding hospitals and other
nonprofits that operate a business). 
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of the fifty largest foundations indicated that seventy-six percent pay their 
directors.
227
  With respect to grant-making nonprofits generally, a study 
conducted in 2006 found that twenty-eight percent of the 10,000 
foundations surveyed compensated their directors or trustees.
228
  Some 
foundations mandate director compensation in their charter or indenture.
229
  
The rationale in these instances is that compensation is necessary to attract 
the best directors.
230
  A number of scandals
231
 make this rationale highly 
questionable.  In fact, although it has not yet been enacted into law, the 
Massachusetts senate voted for a provision that would have banned 
compensation to nonprofit directors.
232
  Also, as noted earlier, the 
Massachusetts and Oregon attorneys general called for legislation to 
require the attorney general’s approval for any nonprofit that compensates 
its directors.
233
  At a minimum, the authors firmly believe that if a nonprofit 
227. Lisa Chiu, Most of America’s 50 Richest Funds Pay Their Board Members, CHRON.
OF PHILANTHROPY, July 24, 2011 (noting that thirty-eight of the fifty largest foundations pay 
their directors). 
228. ELIZABETH T. BORIS ET AL., FOUNDATION EXPENSES AND COMPENSATION: HOW
OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS INFLUENCE SPENDING, 31 (finding that although 23.8% of 
independent foundations compensated trustees, fewer corporate (7.6%) and community 
foundations (3.2%) compensated their directors).  For those 2,181 foundations that 
compensated trustees, 2,110 (96.7%) were independent foundations.  Id.  About 2% of 
independent foundation trustees received compensation, while only 3.2% of corporate 
foundation trustees and less than 1 percent of community foundation trustees 
were compensated.  Id.  For those foundations compensating directors, the 
median compensation was $7,750; the 75th percentile was $20,036.  Id.  The average 
(mean) compensation was $15,637; when uncompensated trustees are included, the mean 
drops to $2,417.  Id. 
229. For example, the original indenture for the Duke Endowment stated:  “Each trustee
shall be paid at the end of each calendar year one equal fifteenth part of three percent of the 
incomes, revenues and profits received by the trustees upon the trust properties and estate 
during such year . . . .”  ROBERT FRANKLIN DURDEN, LASTING LEGACY TO THE CAROLINAS:
THE DUKE ENDOWMENT, 1924–1994 337 (1998).  The current version, as modified by court 
order, provides that trustees shall be compensated annually pursuant to the order.  THE DUKE
ENDOWMENT: INDENTURE OF TRUST 4 (2009). 
230. See Chiu, supra note 227 (noting however that some foundations, following the
trend of most nonprofits, have moved away from compensating directors). 
231. Robert Weisman, Insurer’s Board Suspends Own Pay, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 2011
WLNR 4566359 (Mar. 9, 2011); see also Letter from David G. Spackman, Chief, Non-
Profit Organizations/Public Charities Division, Office of the Att’y General, to Four 
Chairmen of the Boards of Various Massachusetts Health Care Organizations (Apr. 14, 
2011) (http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/nonprofit/director-compensation-report-4-14-11.pdf) 
(finding director compensation does not meet the minimum standards of good governance). 
232. Lisa Chiu, Mass. May Soon Ban Pay for Trustees of Nonprofit Groups, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, June 24, 2011 (noting that Massachusetts “is on the verge of passing the 
first state ban on payments to trustees of all nonprofit organizations”). 
233. Lisa Chiu, Lawmakers in 2 States Strike Down High-Profile Bills to Regulate
Nonprofits, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, July 6, 2011, http://philanthropy.com/article/High-
Profile-Bills-to-Regulate/128152 (noting that “[e]fforts in Massachusetts and Oregon to 
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organization compensates its governing board members, those directors or 
trustees should not be absolved from liability for their misconduct.
234
 
Director or trustee compensation is not necessary in most cases nor is 
it feasible for most nonprofits.  Nonprofit directors who volunteer may be 
viewed as motivated by “psychic pay.”235  This may include board 
members’ personal satisfaction, believing that good work is being done and 
that their volunteer efforts as board members have contributed to that 
public good.  In any event, the authors firmly believe, and generally 
accepted nonprofit governance principles reflect, that volunteering for 
board service includes an agreement to exercise due diligence in board 
oversight responsibilities.
236
 
place new financial restrictions on nonprofits have failed to become law”). 
234. For example, the liability shield in volunteer statutes is not applicable to directors
who are compensated.  See infra notes 327–43 and accompanying text. 
235. Lisa Chiu, supra note 227 (
Many of the biggest foundations have also decided they don’t want to pay board
members.
Of the top 50 foundations, The Chronicle surveyed, 12 did not compensate their
directors, including the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation, and the David and Lucile Packard Foundation.
While the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation does not pay its board, which
consists of the Gateses and Warren Buffett, 16 members of the foundation’s
three advisory panels are offered an honorarium of $4,000 for each of the two
meetings held annually; chairs of those committees are offered $5,000.
At the Packard Foundation, its vice president, Chris DeCardy, says, “Our
approach of not compensating our trustees, beyond travel expenses, has worked
well with our history and values as an organization.  We have consistently heard
from our trustees that they find it an honor to serve on the board.”
And while donor intent is often cited as a rationale for board compensation,
sometimes donor intent holds the exact opposite.
The automotive pioneer Charles Stewart Mott, who established his foundation
in Flint, Mich., in 1926, specifically stated in the charter that board members
would not receive compensation.
“We have never paid, nor will we,” says William White, the Mott Foundation’s
president.  But he says he’s not necessarily against board pay at other
organizations.
“There has to be some type of compensation whether it’s pay or psychic pay.  If
you’re not going to pay, the way you get good trustees is by emotionally
connecting with them.  They need to believe in what you are doing, and if they
don’t, you probably wouldn’t even want them.”
). 
236. ALI NONPROFIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 37.
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XI. CONSIDERATION OF BEST PRACTICES FOR NONPROFIT BOARDS
A number of best practices can be identified as a result of the 
foregoing enhancements to IRS Form 990.  A number of organizations 
provide lists or guides to suggested best practices.
237
  Consider, for 
example, the following list of suggested best practices recommending that 
nonprofits: 
Implement an annual disclosure questionnaire to determine each 
board member’s independence and the family or business 
relationships between and among directors/trustees, officers and 
key employees. 
Adopt (if not already adopted) or Review (if a policy currently 
exists) a Conflict of Interest Policy.  The policy should: 
• Cover trustees/directors, officers, key employees, others
with substantial influence
• Require disclosure of actual/potential conflicts of
interest
• Implement annual disclosure process to determine if
conflicts exist
• Include procedures for determining whether a
relationship, financial interest or business affiliation
results in a conflict
• Prescribe a course of action when a conflict is identified
• Require independent directors to review and approve
transactions where a conflict of interest exists
• Require appropriate documentation of actions
• Require conflicted person to leave room and recuse
him/herself from discussion and decision
• Require contemporaneous documentation of board and
committee meetings and establish recommended
practices for contents of documentation and for
retaining such documentation.  For this purpose,
contemporaneous means the document must be prepared
by the later of (1) the next meeting of the governing
body or committee, or (2) 60 days after the date of the
meeting and reviewed and approved by the governing
body or committee within a reasonable time period
thereafter.
237. For a particularly useful accountability self-assessment tool, see Arizona
Grantmakers Forum, Self-Assessment Tool, http://www.arizonagrantmakersforum.org/ 
resources/Accountability-Self-Assessment-Tool.aspx (last visited July 30, 2011); see also 
COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN FOUNDATIONS, ACCOUNTABILITY SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS (Forum of Regional Associations of Grantmakers, ed.,  2007). 
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• Adopt an executive compensation process that includes
a determination of the positions whose compensation is
to be reviewed; review and approval of the
compensation decisions by an independent committee
based on appropriate comparability data; and
contemporaneous documentation of the decision.
238
Suggested best practices also detail appropriate processes for setting 
executive and employees’ compensation.239 
The IRS does not explicitly require nonprofits to adopt compensation 
and conflict of interest policies.  However, a nonprofit’s failure to adopt 
practices and policies governing executive compensation can result in the 
organization not qualifying for the benefit of the IRS safe harbor that 
results in a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness for executive 
compensation decisions.  A rebuttable presumption applies if executive 
238. YAFFE & CO., THE NEW FORM 990 AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION: “BEST 
PRACTICE” RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BOARDS AND COMPENSATION COMMITTEES 4–5 (2009). 
239. The following compensation practices were also recommended as stemming from
the IRS changes to Form 990: 
Adopt an executive compensation philosophy that outlines the process and 
procedures for reviewing and approving the total compensation paid to senior 
executives and “key employees” 
Appoint a compensation committee comprised of independent members of the 
board 
Adopt a compensation committee charter that sets out, among other things, the 
purpose, responsibility and authority of the compensation committee, including 
the following: 
• Adherence to the compensation philosophy
• Compliance with the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
• Use of an independent compensation consultant to provide
comparability data
Adopt an expense reimbursement policy that outlines the procedure for 
the payment, reimbursement or provision of the following expenses, 
including requiring substantiation prior to reimbursement: 
• First class or charter travel
• Travel for companions
• Tax indemnification and gross-up payments
• Discretionary spending accounts
• Housing allowance or residence for personal use
• Payments for business use of personal residence
• Health or social club dues or initiation fees
• Personal services (maid, chauffeur, chef, etc.)
Id. at 6. 
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compensation decisions are based on appropriate comparability data and 
are approved by an “independent” body whose approval is documented 
contemporaneously.
240
 
It is true that the IRS disclosures do not require better governance 
practices.  However, they clearly are designed to strongly encourage 
transparency and accountability in setting executive compensation.  It 
seems that the state-law imposed duties of care and good faith at a 
minimum require the board to consider whether to adopt appropriate 
governance practices and procedures for setting compensation.  Given the 
cost of losing a tax exemption (even on a temporary basis), the board 
should think long and hard before making a decision not to follow best 
practices in this area. 
The enhanced IRS 990 filings are not the only example of increased 
scrutiny for nonprofits.  In June 2011, the IRS posted a list of more than 
275,000 nonprofits that lost their nonprofit tax-exempt status for failure to 
file their Form 990.
241
  It is quite astounding that the minimal task of filing 
a Form 990 with the IRS was ignored by so many nonprofit organizations.  
The large number is certainly at least circumstantial evidence that many 
nonprofit boards are not doing their due diligence in overseeing operations. 
Nonprofit corporations—especially those with a charitable mission—
comprise a public good.
242
  If anything, this warrants holding nonprofit 
directors to higher standards of care and loyalty than in the for-profit 
sector.  On the other hand, while corporate directors of larger companies 
are generally compensated, nonprofit directors are usually volunteers.
243
  It 
has been suggested that imposing high fiduciary duties on nonprofit 
directors will deter good people from serving on nonprofit boards.
244
  Due 
to the public benefit from encouraging nonprofit volunteers, most states 
240. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2011).
241. IRS, AUTOMATIC REVOCATION OF TAX EXEMPT STATUS (Jun. 8, 2011); see also IRS,
Recent Revocations of 501(c)(3) Determinations—Latest Additions and Table of Links, 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=141466,00.html (last visited Jan. 20, 
2012). 
242. See, e.g., Lesher, supra note 48, at 969 (“The justification [for a higher fiduciary
duty] seems to lie in the fact that the assets of the non-profit corporation come in many 
cases from public solicitations or contributions and therefore are more like a trust res than 
corporate capital.”). 
243. There have been some controversial examples of nonprofit director compensation.
For example, Massachusetts Blue Cross voluntarily suspended directors’ compensation in 
light of a mounting controversy.  See, e.g., Robert Weisman, Insurer’s Board Suspends Own 
Pay, BOSTON GLOBE 1 (Mar. 9, 2011) (reporting that Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts “voted to suspend their five-figure annual directors’ payments”); Leter from 
Spackman, supra note 231 (noting excessive compensation involving various healthcare 
nonprofits). 
244. Lesher, supra note 48, at 969.
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have volunteer statutes that insulate volunteers (including directors of 
charitable nonprofit corporations) from liability even more than the 
exculpatory provisions of the nonprofit statutes.
245
  The resulting 
conundrum is the heightened director duties that are imposed as a result of 
nonprofit corporation and tax laws are counterbalanced by extreme 
limitations on liability of nonprofit directors.  There are some 
commentators who maintain that even existing liability provisions go too 
far, and nonprofit directors should be further immunized.
246
  Alternatively 
they argue that fiduciary duties should be scaled back or eliminated.
247
  We 
disagree.  There may be merit in retaining high fiduciary standards 
combined with the limited liability and immunity provisions that already 
exist.  Although some suggest that the remedies should be expanded,
248
 the 
absence of more robust liability provisions does not necessarily mean that 
the law’s message with respect to oversight obligations is hollow. 
The preceding discussion has explored the wisdom of such a 
divergence and concluded that the current balance of responsibility and 
accountability is appropriate and is sufficient to encourage proper director 
behavior in the nonprofit world. 
Nonprofits have the option of establishing governing boards, which 
have a monitoring function, or advisory boards, which do not.  When a 
nonprofit adopts a governing board, nonprofit corporation acts typically 
require a board of directors and that board of directors by definition has a 
monitoring function.  Although there may be a temptation for a nonprofit 
board of directors to act as a rubber stamp for the executive director’s or 
management’s recommendations, this type of blind allegiance to 
management clearly does not satisfy even the most minimal due diligence 
obligations.
249
  Unfortunately, many nonprofit boards in fact act as a rubber 
245. See, e.g., infra notes 327–43 and accompanying text (discussing volunteer
immunity statutes). 
246. See, e.g., Lesher, supra note 48.
247. See, e.g., Rummana Alam, Note, Not What the Doctors Ordered: Nonprofit
Hospitals and the New Corporate Governance Requirements, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 229 
(2011). 
248. See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate
Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 
701 (2008) (arguing that the fiduciary duty of care plays an important role in curbing 
director misbehavior in the nonprofit context, but enforcement mechanisms could be greatly 
improved); Danne L. Johnson, Seeking Meaningful Nonprofit Reform in a Post Sarbanes-
Oxley World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 187 (2009) (arguing that reform is needed); see also 
James Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7 PACE L.
REV. 389 (1986) (same). 
249. Judith L. Miller, The Board as a Monitor of Organizational Activity: The
Applicability of Agency Theory to Nonprofit Boards, 12 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 
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stamp, and this reflects inattention or an “abdication” of directors’ 
oversight responsibilities.
250
  Surprisingly, there is some evidence that the 
lack of meaningful oversight increases with the size of the nonprofit.
251
  
This is counter intuitive and a bad result if true since the larger the amount 
of assets under supervision, the higher the board members’ responsibility 
should be. 
One of the suggested causes of too many rubber stamp directors is an 
organization’s failure to have appropriate selection criteria for nonprofit 
directors.
252
  Nominating and/or governance committees should be mindful 
of seeking out candidates that will not simply be rubber stamps but at the 
same time will be a good fit for the organization.  Many nonprofit boards 
are small and often consist of family members or paid executives of the 
organization.
253
  Having a homogeneous
254
 board composed primarily of 
429, 438 (2002);  see also, Johnson, supra note 248, at 206; Consuelo Lauda Kertz, 
Executive Compensation Dilemmas in Tax-Exempt Organizations: Reasonableness, 
Comparability, and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L. REV. 819, 855 (1997) (stating that “[b]oard 
membership often consists of the executive’s friends and cronies, and there is often 
reciprocity—individuals sitting on one another’s boards”). 
250. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D.D.C. 1974) (finding that directors failed to engage in even the 
most cursory supervision by defendant directors and this amounted to a “[t]otal abdication” 
of their responsibilities). 
251. Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction, THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 36 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003); see also Ralph M. Kramer,
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND THE PERSONAL SOCIAL SERVICES, IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK 240, 244 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (“Large or small . . . most 
voluntary agencies are unusually dependent on the quality of their executive leadership and, 
therefore, more subject to idiosyncratic rather than structural factors.”) quoted in Johnson, 
supra note 248, at 206–07. 
252. James J. Fishman, Standards of Conduct for Directors of Nonprofit Corporations, 7
PACE L. REV. 389, 397 (1987) ( 
Because nonprofits tend to have many directors who are on the board for 
“window dressing” only, a common phenomenon of nonprofit boards is 
directors who do not direct.  The “figurehead” directors assume non-involved 
roles on the board, rarely attending meetings, and certainly never involving 
themselves in oversight responsibilities.  They are corrosive to nonprofit 
corporations in that they allow employees or fellow directors to dominate the 
organization. 
). 
253. Consider, for example, a nonprofit that the Missouri Attorney General convinced to
increase its board size so as to wrest control from one individual.  Grant Williams, Changes 
at Kauffman Foundation Approved by Missouri Attorney General, CHRON. OF 
PHILANTHROPY, Sept. 16, 2004; Stephen Roth, Nixon says Kauffman has Beefed Up KC 
Commitment, KANS. CITY BUS. J., Sept. 1, 2004.  A number of nonprofits lost a good deal of 
money investing in Bernard Madoff funds and most of those nonprofits had small governing 
boards.  Ian Wilhelm, Madoff Foundation Victims Lacked Adequate Board Size, Says 
Report, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 25, 2009, http://philanthropy.com/article/Madoff-
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insiders can lead to complacency as compared to a board containing a mix 
of inside and outside (or independent) directors.
255
  Instead, an effective 
governing board should consist of members from diverse backgrounds
256
 
with a wide range of skills, including financial expertise.
257
  At a minimum, 
each board member should have sufficient financial literacy to be able to 
read and understand balance sheets and cash flow.
258
  The importance of 
having qualified and diverse board members should not be underestimated.  
In other words, “[d]irectors can no longer afford to be merely passive or 
honorary, but must be involved and informed to mitigate the risk to 
themselves and the organization.”259 
A director’s due diligence obligations and duty to remain informed 
mean that the director must ask probing questions in order to make an 
informed decision as to what he or she reasonably believes to be in the 
organization’s best interests.  To avoid being a rubber stamp, a director 
must not have an overdeveloped sense of collegiality or fear being viewed 
Foundation-Victims/63116 (“Of the 150 or so nonprofit organizations affected by the 
Madoff Ponzi scheme, 105 lost 30 percent to all of their assets. Of that group, the median 
board size was three people, said the report by the National Committee for Responsive 
Philanthropy, a foundation watchdog group in Washington.”); see also, NIKI  JAGPAL & 
JULIA CRAIG, LEARNING FROM MADOFF: LESSONS FOR FOUNDATION BOARDS 4 (2009) 
(recommending that foundation boards have at least five members with diverse perspectives 
and backgrounds, and that maintaining policies and practices supporting ethical behavior 
can help retain the public trust). 
254. Wilhelm, supra note 253.
255. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO.
L.J. 797 (2001) (discussing rationales for a mix of inside and outside directors).
256. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Board Diversity and Corporate Performance Filling
in the Gaps, Limits of the Business Case and the Connection Between Supporting Rationales 
and the Appropriate Response of the Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. 887 (2011) (providing an 
overview of rationales for increased board diversity). 
257. Cardinaels, supra note 151 (suggesting a positive correlation between board
expertise and effective monitoring of executive compensation). 
258. See, e.g., BONNIE G. HILL, THE HOME DEPOT: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OVERVIEW,
SIXTH ANNUAL DIRECTORS’ INSTITUTE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (2008), (“Those 
nominated for director must demonstrate integrity, accountability, informed judgment, 
financial literacy, passion, creativity and vision.”); see also, Robert T. Harper & Stephanie 
W. Schreiber, Hospital Boards of Directors—The Challenges of Being a Hospital
Director—Fiduciary Duties, Governance Issues and Board Composition, 78 PA. BAR
ASSOC. Q. 130 (2007) (“[A]ll board members, as part of their board training, should receive
basic financial literacy training so that they can understand board financial reports and
budgets.”); Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice, INDEP. SECTOR 14 (2007)
(Because the board must ensure that all financial matters of the organization are conducted
legally, ethically and in accordance with proper accounting rules, it should make every
effort to ensure that at least one member has “financial literacy”).
259. Rucci, supra note 19.
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as not a team player. 
A number of observers and commentators contend that holding 
nonprofit directors to high fiduciary standards is an undue interference with 
decision-making.
260
  Others have argued that the standards should be 
raised,
261
 or that standing should be expanded to increase remedies for 
nonprofit board member failures.
262
  Existing law seems ample if properly 
applied.  Courts have imposed relatively broad standing requirements 
where appropriate.  For example, in one case a federal district court 
allowed patients of a nonprofit hospital to maintain a class action for 
alleged breach of trust to prevent continued injury to the hospital caused by 
the trustees’ alleged self-dealing and overreaching.263  Furthermore, as 
professor and former SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid has pointed 
out, increasing the standard of care or expanding standing requirements 
would likely result in increased efforts to insulate directors from liability.
264
  
Although the remedies to redress failures of nonprofit directors remain 
260. See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose is Not Good for the
Gander: Sarbanes-Oxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981 (2007) (arguing 
that Sarbanes-Oxley governance reforms would be of little use for nonprofits); Karen 
Donnelly, Note, Good Governance: Has the IRS Usurped the Business Judgment of Tax-
Exempt Organizations in the Name of Transparency and Accountability?, 79 U.M.K.C. L. 
REV. 163 (2010) (criticizing the IRS’s expansion of Form 990 as an unfortunate intrusion on 
corporate governance and the business judgment rule). 
261. See, e.g., Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect
Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (2003). 
262. See, e.g., Joshua B. Nix, Note, The Things People Do When No One Is Looking: An
Argument for the Expansion of Standing in the Charitable Sector, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
147 (2005) (arguing for expanded standing requirements).  But cf. Rob Atkinson, Unsettled 
Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 
655 (1998) (discussing the complex nature of deciding whether to expand traditional 
standing doctrines for challenging nonprofit fiduciaries).  Notably, Professor Atkinson refers 
to H.L. Mencken’s admonition that “there is always a well-known solution to every human 
problem—neat, plausible, and wrong.”  H.L. Mencken, PREJUDICES 158 (2d ed. 1977), 
quoted in Atkinson, supra note 262, at 657; see also, e.g., Mark Hall & John Columbo, The 
Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 
WASH. L. REV. 307, 330 n.76 (1991) (“[F]or every complex problem, there is a solution 
which is simple, elegant . . . and wrong.”). 
263. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries,
381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974) (finding that at the same time the court denied standing 
under the antitrust laws and also denied a class action seeking damages for the alleged 
improprieties). 
264. Goldschmid, supra note 51, at 643 (“the absence of enforcement (because of
forbearance by state charity regulators, understaffing, and highly restricted standing), not the 
“lowness” of care standards, makes [nonprofit] care standards largely aspirational. . . . [I]f 
enforcement opportunities are enhanced, nonprofit law may have to build in . . . mitigating 
provisions found in the for-profit sector.) (footnotes omitted) (quoting AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
134, § 7.19 at 239–60 (1994)). 
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limited, there has long been a sense by many observers that nonprofit 
directors have and should have a higher duty than directors of for-profit 
corporations.
265
 
We would like to think that increased education and best practices 
could help increase the oversight role of nonprofit directors because it is 
the right thing to do.
266
  However, as one observer pointed out, quoting 
H.L. Mencken, “Conscience is the inner voice that warns us somebody may
be looking.”267  Although state attorneys general have oversight
responsibilities for nonprofit organizations,
268
 it is clear that many do not
have time or resources to get involved except in extreme cases.
269
  There is
only so much that we can realistically expect from state policing of
charities.
270
265. See, e.g., Lesher, supra note 48 (“It may well be argued, as in fact seems to be the
law in most jurisdictions, that the duty of a director in a non-profit corporation is higher than 
that in a profit corporation and is in the nature of a trustee’s duty to his beneficiary.”). 
266. Increased education and the establishment of best practices have been among the
suggested solutions.  See, e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 51, at 649–50 (recommending “Self-
Help: More Precise Specification of Functions, Guidelines, and Enhanced Educational 
Efforts”). 
267. Nix, supra note 262, at 147 (quoting H.L. Mencken, A MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY
(1949)). 
268. See, e.g., State ex rel. Petro v. Gold, 850 N.E.2d 1218 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006)
(finding breach of fiduciary duties by executive director in connection with use of 
professional solicitation firms). 
269. See, e.g., Susan Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 623 (1999) (discussing the 
understaffing of state attorneys general and their inability to address nonprofit abuses); 
Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State 
Responsibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 476 (1960) (suggesting a centralized state board to 
supervise private charities rather than the attorney general); Nix, supra note 262, at 167–81 
(discussing the relative ineffectiveness of state attorneys general in policing nonprofits).  
The National Association of Attorneys General acknowledged this problem many years ago.  
See Number of Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Attorney Positions by Selected Practice Areas: 
“Public Protection”, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL 18, 20 (1997) (identifying staff 
available for charitable supervision).  The National Association of Attorneys General 
website lists a number of important initiatives but charitable supervision is not one of them.  
See Initiatives, NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, http://www.naag.org/initiatives.php 
(last visited June 16, 2011) (including, among other things, Amber Alert, DEA National 
Drug Take Back Day, Federal Trade Commission Money Matters for Consumers, Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global)). 
The association nevertheless cosponsored a conference on the Intersection of Technology, 
the Charitable Sector and State Regulators.   NAGTRI Co-Sponsors Charities Conference, 
NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, http://www.naag.org/nagtri-co-sponsors-charities-
conference.php (last visited June 16, 2011). 
270. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Whose Public?, Parochialism and Paternalism in State
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004) (discussing the appropriate role of the 
state in policing charities); Jennifer L. Komoroski, Note, The Hershey Trust’s Quest to 
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XII.  LIMITED REMEDIES FOR DIRECTOR MISCONDUCT
A. Overview of Enforcement Issues
Nonprofit statutes typically give their state attorneys general the 
authority to police nonprofits.  In some states, such as California, the 
attorney general is given broad authority to assure that nonprofit 
corporations are operating properly and in accordance with law.
271
  
Whereas in other states, the attorney general’s authority is more limited.272  
The California Attorney General has taken an aggressive stance in the face 
of abuses.  For example, in a highly publicized situation involving the 
foundation for the Museum of Contemporary Art (MOCA) in Los Angeles, 
it was suggested that a possible sanction for misuse of funds could be to 
hold the directors who approve those expenses accountable even though 
they did not receive the benefits.
273
  This would be a striking provision in 
Diversify: Redefining the State Attorney General’s Role When Charitable Trusts Wish to 
Diversify, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1769 (2004) (discussing the attorney general’s role in 
policing charities). 
271. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (2005); see also, Summers v. Cherokee Children &
Family Serv., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 506–07 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“The drafters of the 
Revised Model Act intended that the Attorney General of the incorporating state have wide 
discretion and broad powers in regulating public benefit corporations to ensure that they 
operate as nonprofits.”). 
272. See, e.g., Blumenthal Gen. v. Robin Barnes, 804 A.2d 152, 157 (Conn. 2002)
(finding that the attorney general lacked statutory authority to challenge corporation’s use of 
noncharitable receipts).  The court concluded that the attorney general did not have the 
authority under common law.  Id.; see also, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 68 A.D.2d 488, 
495 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (finding that attorney general did not have standing to enforce a 
charity’s right to receive dividends, but noted that the attorney general could effectuate the 
purpose of donations).  On the other hand, the court noted: 
[I]t is clear that the Attorney-General’s powers of representation and
enforcement, whether of statutory or equity origin, are not limited to express
trusts, but encompass those charitable dispositions where property has been
donated for a specific purpose.  In such cases a trust will be implied in the sense
that the donated property will be required to be used for the purposes for which
it was given and it is the duty and responsibility of the attorney general to
require that these purposes be effectuated.
Id. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
273. Mike Boehm, State tells MOCA to Shape Up, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at 1 (“A
spokeswoman for the Attorney General’s office said Thursday penalties could include a 
requirement that board members repay money drawn improperly from an endowment, but 
‘whether and how that occurs is based on the facts and circumstances of each situation.’”).  
The attorney general asserts this as one of his general powers with respect to nonprofits.  
See EDMUND G. BROWN JR., CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES 34
(2005) (stating that the attorney general can sue directors for mismanagement and the 
proceeds from the suit will go to the charity). 
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light of the qualified immunity that attaches to nonprofit director 
wrongdoing.
274
 
Under an outmoded view in California, only the state attorney general 
and not the donor could bring suit complaining about a charity’s 
management of funds.
275
  However, California overruled the holding that 
the attorney general has the exclusive right to sue for foundation 
mismanagement.
276
  California is now in line with the general view that the 
attorney general’s role in challenging nonprofit corporations is not 
exclusive.
277
  Accordingly, the trustees or directors of a foundation have 
standing to challenge mismanagement by the foundation’s managers.278  
For example, in one case the trustees were allowed to challenge the 
foundation manager and defendant trustees causing an amendment of the 
articles of incorporation to change the name and the purpose of the 
foundation.
279
  Attempts to change a charity’s mission can result in 
tremendous controversy.
280
 
274. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231 (2010) (after setting forth the general duty of
care, the statute provides that except in self-dealing transactions, directors generally have no 
liability); see also id. § 5239 (qualified immunity for negligence to third parties).  It is 
noteworthy that liability in actions by the attorney general is expressly excluded from this 
immunity provision in actions by third parties.  Curiously, however, this provision does not 
address the exculpatory language in § 5231.  Id. § 5239(e)(2).  Volunteer and nonprofit 
director immunity statutes are discussed infra notes 333–43 and accompanying text. 
275. See George Pepperdine Found. v. Pepperdine, 271 P.2d 600 (Cal. App. 1954)
(dismissing donor’s lawsuit and holding that the attorney general was the exclusive way to 
challenge management of foundation funds); see also, Robert L. Gray. State Attorney 
General—Guardian of Public Charities, 14 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 236 (1965) (discussing the 
Pepperdine case and the attorney general’s role in policing nonprofits).  Cf. O’Donnell v. 
Sardegna, 646 A.2d 398 (Md. 1994) (Blue Cross Blue Shield subscribers did not have 
standing to challenge alleged mismanagement; attorney general would be the appropriate 
person to sue). 
276. Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964).
277. See, e.g., Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2001) (finding that attorney general is not the exclusive enforcer; noting that 
“[t]he donor of a charitable gift is in a better position than the Attorney General to be 
vigilant and, if he or she is so inclined, to enforce his or her own intent”).  Cf. Lopez v. 
Medford Cmty. Ctr., Inc., 424 N.E.2d 229 (Mass. 1981) (members’ suit claiming 
mismanagement by nonprofit directors could not be brought without joining attorney 
general); Gilbert M. and Martha H. Hitchcock Found. v. Kountze, 720 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 
2006) (finding that although derivative suit against nonprofit was appropriate, notice to the 
attorney general is a condition to the court considering the merits of the suit). 
278. Holt, 394 P.2d at 932.
279. Id. at 938; see also, Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1977) (finding, in action brought by the state attorney general, that nonprofit using 
funds for medical clinics instead of operating a hospital breached the duty of obedience). 
280. See, e.g., Chris Abbinmante, Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations:
Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1997) 
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B. Remedies for Director Abuses:  Director Removal
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that meaningful 
accountability for nonprofit directors’ breaches of duty is extremely 
limited.  The basic remedies for director misconduct would include action 
by the attorney general,
281
 and in a membership nonprofit, there is the 
possibility of a derivative suit.
282
 
In an extreme case of director misconduct, the director may be subject 
to removal for cause.
283
  Following the pattern for business corporations,
284
 
the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act provides for removal of directors by 
directors or members (if any) as well as judicial removal for cause.
285
  
Many states also allow for director removal without cause unless that 
authority is denied in the articles of incorporation.
286
  At least thirty states 
(discussing the Barnes Foundation and other examples of trustees disregarding donor 
intent); Eisenstein, supra note 223 (discussing the tension between donor intent and 
charitable interest in conjunction with attempts to change the mission of the Barnes 
Foundation established to manage an art collection); see also, Jonathan Klick & Robert H. 
Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s 
Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2008) (detailing the Hershey Trust’s attempt to sell a 
controlling interest in Hershey Co. to diversify the trust’s investments); Jennifer L. 
Kmoroski, The Hershey Trust’s Quest to Diversify: Redefining the State Attorney General’s 
with Charitable Trusts Wish to Diversify, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1769 (2004) (same); 
Mark Sidel, The Struggle for Hershey: Community Accountability and the Law in Modern 
American Philanthropy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2003) (same). 
281. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 14.30(1) (2008) (authorizing the
attorney general to bring suit to dissolve noncompliant nonprofit corporations). 
282. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (West 2005) (describing members’ derivative
suits); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-7-40 (2009) (describing derivative suits by a member or a 
director); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT ch. 13 (2009) (describing derivative suits 
generally); id. § 13.02 (authorizing a derivative suit to be brought by the lesser of five 
percent or fifty persons with voting rights or any member or director of a designated body). 
283. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT § 55A-8-10(a) (2009) (explaining that a court may
remove a director if:  “(1) The director engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct, or gross 
abuse of authority or discretion, with respect to the corporation, or a final judgment has been 
entered finding that the director has violated a duty set forth in [N.C. GEN STAT. §] G.S. 
55A-8-30 through [N.C. GEN STAT. §] G.S. 55A-8-33, and (2) Removal is in the best 
interest of the corporation”).  The action for judicial removal may be brought by either the 
corporation or ten percent of the members if it is a membership nonprofit corporation.  Id. § 
8-08.  In addition to judicial removal for cause, directors may be removed with or without
cause (unless the articles limit removal to for cause) by the directors or members who
elected them.  Cf. Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998)
(describing how the Board of Regents recommended the removal of eighteen university
trustees for neglect of their duty of due care) (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.08, 8.09 (2007).
285. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.08, 8.09 (2008).
286. See, e.g., id. § 8.08 (2008) (providing that directors can be removed with or without
cause unless the articles of incorporation state that directors can only be removed for cause); 
see also, Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 884 A.2d 512 (Del. 2005) 
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have nonprofit director removal statutes that are fairly similar to Model Act 
§ 8.08, including deference to rules stated in articles of incorporation or
bylaws.
287
  Twenty-one states have adopted judicial removal statutes for
nonprofit directors that are fairly similar to Model Act § 8.09.  Most of the
statutes authorizing judicial removal of directors for cause require the
action be brought by plaintiffs having a minimum stated amount of voting
power (usually ten percent) when the action is brought by voting members
or directors, as opposed to an action brought by the attorney general.
288
Even in the absence of a statutory definition, director misconduct can be
sufficiently egregious to constitute cause for removal.
289
  For example, a
director’s misuse of the organization’s funds for personal purposes is
grounds for removal.
290
  Similarly, a director’s ignoring the conflict of
interest statutes
291
 and setting his salary in excess of an organization’s rules
would also qualify as grounds for removal for cause.
292
  Other types of self-
dealing are grounds for removal as well.
293
  A significant failure to comply
with the organization’s rules and procedures can be grounds for director
removal.
294
  A director’s refusal to participate in board meetings and a
(upholding the removal of a nonprofit director who allegedly inappropriately used about 
$55,000 and noting that removal without cause is allowed by the Delaware statute). 
287. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 10-3808 (2011) (providing that a director may be
removed pursuant to the articles of incorporation or bylaws); CAL. CORP. CODE § 5222 
(West 2005) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-8-09 (2009) (same). 
288. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5223 (West 2005).
289. See, e.g., In re Charles M. Bair Family Trust, 183 P.3d 61 (Mont. 2008) (removing
a museum board for a breach of fiduciary duties, including the failure to follow the 
museum’s purpose and closing the museum); Lutz v. Tanglwood Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, 866 
A.2d 471, 472 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005) (permitting questionable practices without informing
that auditors could be removed for cause).
290. See, e.g., People v. Winston, No. 007180/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 2010) (finding
sufficient cause for removal under New York Not-for-Profit Corporate Law § 706 where 
two directors had used approximately $13,000 in company debit cards for personal 
purchases); John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795, 802 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming the removal 
of an officer and trustee for “gross misconduct”); see also Turkish v. Kasenetz, 832 F. Supp. 
565, 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68, while noting that the New York 
nonprofit director removal statute was enacted to deal with abuses such as fraud). 
291. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60 (2008) (providing conflict
of interest provisions). 
292. Nixon v. Lichtenstein, 959 S.W.2d 854, 861 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
293. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Daniels, 906 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that
removal for cause could be established where a director transferred real property to himself 
from a non-profit without paying any consideration or seeking approval for the transaction). 
294. See, e.g., Simoni v. Civil Serv. Emps. Ass’n, Local 1000, 507 N.Y.S.2d 371, 377
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (finding that a board member or officer’s failure to comply with 
CSEA’s constitution and bylaws could be a ground for removal for cause); see also, Matzel 
v. Stonecrest Ranch Prop. Owners’ Ass’n, 305 S.W.3d 368, 373 (Tex. App. 2010)
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complete disregard of the organization’s requirements are causes for 
removal.
295
  A single or isolated instance of noncompliance will not 
ordinarily be grounds for removal for cause.
296
  Quite properly, courts are 
reluctant to order removal for cause except in extreme cases.
297
  For 
example, disagreement among directors is not sufficient to justify removal 
for cause.
298
  In fact, a director’s obligation to do what he or she reasonably 
believes is in the best interest of the organization may lead him or her to 
voice disagreement rather than remain silent in order to fit in as a team 
player. 
C. Role of the Attorney General
As noted above, director removal may be initiated by the attorney 
general.
299
  The attorney general’s authority to institute an action for 
removal is viewed as part of his equitable powers, even in the absence of 
(dismissing a lawsuit challenging plaintiff’s removal from the board). 
295. Gilbert M. & Martha H. Hitchcock Found. v. Kountze, 720 N.W.2d 31, 33–35
(Neb. 2006), aff’d, 751 N.W.2d 129 (Neb. 2008) (upholding judicial removal of a nonprofit 
director for gross abuse of authority where the director refused to participate in board 
meetings for the preceding four years, changed the corporation’s registered office without 
board approval, and attempted to hold elections for new directors without giving notice to 
other directors). 
296. See, e.g., Pullins v. Holmes, 2007 Ohio 4603, ¶ 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (holding
that defendant’s refusal to recuse herself from meetings discussing a lawsuit filed against 
the corporation by the defendant’s father did not constitute a conflict of interest, and 
therefore her removal under the bylaws was inappropriate); Loveless v. Pocono Forest 
Sportman Club, Inc., 972 A.2d 572, 575–76 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009) (finding that paying 
other board members to perform snow removal and other maintenance work without 
soliciting bids is not sufficient to warrant removal of board members). 
297. See, e.g., Fox v. Cody, 141 Misc. 552, 553–54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930) (suggesting
substantial grounds for showing a breach of trust); In re Lord’s New Church, 817 A.2d 559, 
561 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (dismissing action for removal where defendants “‘had 
employed some heavy-handed tactics’” to gain control of the board, but “had not ‘run afoul 
of the Non-Profit Law so as to justify . . . imposing the drastic remedy of judicial 
supervision of the corporation’s affairs’”) (internal citations omitted). 
298. See, e.g., Campbell v. Loew’s, Inc., 134 A.2d 852, 860–62 (Del. Ch. 1957) (holding
that trying to change corporate policy is not grounds for removal for cause of a business 
corporation’s director); Mortimer v. McKeithan Lumber Corp. 120 S.E. 723 (S.C. 1923) 
(finding that mere disagreement or friction between directors or officers is not cause for 
removal unless disagreement is extreme and interferes with the functioning of the 
corporation). 
299. Cuomo v. Daniels, 906 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (holding that removal
for cause could be established in action by the attorney general); see also, State by & 
Through Pierotti v. Sundquist, 884 S.W.2d 438, 445 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that a quo 
warranto action is consistent with the state’s removal statute where the director is found to 
be grossly negligent for mismanagement of funds). 
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express statutory authority.
300
  As noted earlier, state nonprofit statutes 
typically give state attorneys general broad authority to assure compliance 
with law.  Although on occasion the state attorneys general initiate action 
against nonprofits to address abuses,
301
 attorneys general simply do not 
have the resources to focus on nonprofits as an effective monitor of 
directors’ duties.302 
California has been one of the notable exceptions in terms of state 
attorneys general oversight of nonprofit corporations.  As mentioned 
earlier, California adopted the Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004
303
 that 
imposes heightened audit and disclosure requirements on California 
nonprofits.
304
  In addition, the California attorney general has been active in 
pursuing nonprofit charitable corporations that run afoul of the state’s 
law.
305
  For example, the attorney general will review the nonprofit’s 
disclosures to determine if the directors are living up to their fiduciary 
responsibilities.
306
  In another instance, mentioned earlier, the California 
300. See State v. Family Life Serv., Inc., 616 N.W.2d 826, 843 (N.D. 2000)
(acknowledging equitable authority to remove nonprofit directors). 
301. See, e.g., NC AG Takes Action Against Nonprofit After Channel 9 Investigation,
WSOCTV (Feb. 4, 2011), http://www.wsoctv.com/news/news/nc-ag-takes-action-against-
nonprofit-after-channel/nGTCk/ (Attorney General investigation into alleged NACA 
information mishandling settled) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Business Law); see also Soughata Mukherjee, Right Call on MCNC, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (July 
30, 2001), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2001/07/30/editorial2.html 
(discussing the Durham and Wake County district attorneys’ investigation of private 
investments made by some nonprofit board members). 
302. See Nix, supra note 262, at 176 (discussing problems with understaffing and fiscal
constraints on attorneys general).  Cf. Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 
394 P.2d 932 (Cal. 1964) (describing how an attorney general did not find a problem with 
the actions about which plaintiff trustees complained).  In Holt, the attorney general was not 
the exclusive party to sue.  Id.  The court allowed the plaintiff-trustees to bring suit 
challenging the change in name and mission of the foundation.  Id.  The attorney general 
had found that the change was not a proper one since the funds were still going towards the 
public good even though the plaintiff trustees disagreed.  Id. 
303. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (West 2011).  Other states have similar laws.  See, e.g.,
2005 CONN. ACTS 101 (Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28 (2004). 
304. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (West 2011).
305. See, e.g., Mike Boehm, MOCA Ordered to Revamp Its Budget Practices, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/16/entertainment/la-et-moca-
20100417 (alleging the mismanagement of museum funds); Thomas & Schmidt, Practices of 
Dodgers’ Charity, supra note 58 (investigating the Dodgers’ charity); Thomas & Schmidt, 
Questions, supra note 58 (same). 
306. See, e.g., Letter from California Attorney General to Robert S. Bower, Esq., CAL.
DEP’T OF JUST. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Aug. 6, 2010) (http://ag.ca.gov/cms_ 
attachments/press/pdfs/n1968_closing_letter_for_csu_stanislaus_foundation.pdf) (noting a 
failure to implement an auditor’s recommendations, a failure to adequately protect 
charitable assets, and the board’s failure to fully understand its duties and responsibilities). 
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attorney general suggested that a possible sanction for misuse of a 
charitable organization’s funds could be to hold the directors who approve 
those expenses accountable even though they did not receive the benefits.
307
  
This is a very robust stance in light of immunity that attaches to nonprofit 
director wrongdoing.
308
  In addition, the California attorney general 
publishes an extensive guide for charities,
309
 which, among other things, 
asserts the attorney general’s ability to recover misused assets from 
directors.
310
  A number of states have useful information for directors on 
their website.
311
  Other state attorneys general have been proactive.  For 
example, the Massachusetts and Oregon attorneys general called for 
legislation to require the attorney general’s approval for any nonprofit that 
compensates its directors.
312
  The Oregon attorney general has been very 
aggressive in pursuing violations
313
 and also publishes a list of the twenty 
worst charities in terms of the percentage of contributions that actually go 
to the charitable cause.
314
  New York Governor Cuomo announced an 
investigation into nonprofit compensations, noting that nearly 2,000 
nonprofit employees make just under $169,000.
315
  Some states have also 
307. Boehm, supra note 305.
308. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(C) (West 2011) (providing, after setting forth the
general duty of care, that except in self-dealing transactions,  “a person who performs the 
duties of a director in accordance with subdivisions (a) and (b) shall have no liability based 
upon any alleged failure to discharge the person’s obligations as a director, including, 
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any actions or omissions which exceed or 
defeat a public or charitable purpose to which a corporation, or assets held by it, are 
dedicated”); see also id. § 5239 (providing qualified immunity for negligence to third 
parties).  It is noteworthy that liability in actions by the attorney general is expressly 
excluded from this immunity provision in actions by third parties but does not address the 
exculpatory language in section 5231.  Id. § 5239(e)(2).  Volunteer and nonprofit director 
immunity statutes are discussed in the text accompanying notes 327–43 infra. 
309. EDMOND G. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES , http://ag.ca.gov/charities/publications/guide_for_ 
charities.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2011). 
310. Id. at 34.
311. See, e.g., CHARITIESNYS.COM: ACCESS, REFORM, ACCOUNTABILITY, N.Y. OFFICE OF 
THE ATT’Y GEN., http://www.charitiesnys.com/ (including a link to “Guides and 
Publications” consisting of a collection of documents published to assist charitable 
organizations). 
312. Lisa Chiu, supra note 233.
313. Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Kroger Announces Crackdown
on Non-profits that Exploit Respect for U.S. Military Veterans, (May 18, 2010) 
(http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2010/rel051810.shtml) (listing enforcement actions and 
settlements). 
314. Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Justice, Oregon Attorney General Announces Oregon’s
Worst Charities and Landmark Legislation to Combat Irresponsible Non-profits, (Dec. 9, 
2010) (http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2010/rel120910.shtml). 
315. Michael Gormley, NY Investigates Wages, Bureaucracy at Nonprofits, WALL ST. J., 
(Aug. 3, 2011, 4:57 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/AP4581db54fc74471dae49c55 
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taken an active role in questioning nonprofit organizations’ qualifications 
for state property tax exemptions.
316
 
With respect to for-profit corporations, courts and the law generally 
are reluctant to get involved in the details of a corporation’s operations.317  
However, in the case of nonprofits, the public interest may warrant 
intervention by the attorney general.  For example, in one instance 
involving suspected conflict of interest allegations, the Missouri attorney 
general recommended changes in a nonprofit corporation’s bylaws and 
governance structure that were eventually accepted by the foundation.
318
  
This type of proactive involvement by state attorneys general into corporate 
affairs is appropriate when called for in the case of nonprofits since public 
goods are involved.
319
 
In some states the attorney general posts on his or her website notices 
of nonprofit corporations that have lost their status because of 
noncompliance with law.
320
  Some state attorneys general also provide 
cd0572df6.html (“[A] task force will investigate salaries and other compensation at 
nonprofit agencies where [Gov. Andrew Cuomo] says about 2,000 workers are paid more 
than $100,000 a year.”). 
316. See, e.g., Provena Covenant Med. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 925 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill.
2010) (denying a state property tax exemption to a hospital that was not providing the 
charitable care necessary to retain nonprofit status); Kathy Bergin, Illinois Department of 
Revenue Denies Tax Exemptions for 3 Hospitals, CHIC. TRIBUNE, Aug. 17, 2011 (denying 
property tax exemptions to three hospitals for operating businesses rather than truly 
charitable operations); Stephanie Strom, California Scrutinizes Nonprofits, Sometimes 
Ending a Tax Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2011, at B3 (discussing the increased vigor 
of the California attorney general in scrutinizing tax-exempt status with respect to the 
question of whether the organization provides sufficient benefits to in-state residents).  As 
noted earlier, there is some movement seeking to cancel state property tax exemptions for 
all nonprofits as a way to raise revenue.  See Fleischer, supra note 23, at 601 (discussing the 
charitable tax exemption as a subsidy).  One counter to the property tax issue has been a 
compromise in terms of voluntary payments in lieu of taxes (PILOTs).  PILOTs are beyond 
the scope of this article.  For a report analyzing such programs, see DAPHNE A. KENYON & 
ADAM H. LANGLEY, PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES: BALANCING MUNICIPAL AND NON PROFIT 
INTERESTS (2010). 
317. For example, this is one of the justifications for the business judgment rule.  See
supra text accompanying notes 146–48. 
318. See Williams, supra note 253 (discussing approved changes to the Kauffman
Foundation’s bylaws); Nixon says Kauffman has Beefed up KC Commitment, KANS. CITY 
BUS. J., Sept. 1, 2004 (discussing the policy changes outlined by the Kauffman Foundation’s 
Board of Trustees).  The attorney general’s recommendations also included that the 
foundation’s bylaws be rewritten to require the CEO to move to Kansas City.  Id. 
319. See, e.g., Eisenstein, supra note 223 (arguing that the public interest should always
be considered when assessing the appropriate role for the state in monitoring charities). 
320. See, e.g., Notice of Non-Compliant and De-Activated Charitable Organizations,
THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF MASS., http://www.mass.gov/ago (search 
“noncompliant charity” and follow “Notice of Non-Compliant and De-Activated Charitable 
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helpful compliance information for nonprofits and their directors.
321
 
For years, standing to challenge nonprofit directors was extremely 
limited.  This remains the case notwithstanding the fact that modern 
nonprofit corporation acts authorize derivative litigation.
322
 
D. Derivative Suits
In business corporations, the shareholder derivative suit is a powerful 
weapon for challenging mismanagement.
323
  Nonprofits do not have 
shareholders, but there may still be constituencies who arguably should be 
able to bring derivative suits.  For example, in a membership nonprofit, the 
ability to bring a derivative suit could be conferred on members.  Directors, 
as members of the governing board, could also be given the ability to sue 
derivatively on the organization’s behalf.  At one time it was unclear 
whether derivative litigation could be brought on behalf of nonprofit 
organizations.
324
  Today, most nonprofit corporation acts recognize a 
derivative suit by members or directors.
325
  The potential for significant 
attorneys’ fees is a major motivator in the business world for bringing 
derivative suits.
326
  It is not likely that derivative suits in the nonprofit 
world offer the potential for similar rewards, and thus the expense of 
retaining counsel in most situations may itself be a damper on the 
derivative suit as a meaningful remedy against nonprofit directors.  In 
addition, beyond the problematic standing issues, statutory limitations on 
…” hyperlink). 
321. See, e.g., EDMOND G. BROWN, JR., CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, CALIFORNIA 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDE FOR CHARITIES (2005); Charities, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF 
THE OFFICE OF THE MINN. ATT’Y GEN., http://www.ag.state.mn.us/charities/ (last visited Oct. 
30, 2011); MARK DEWINE, OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL, GUIDE FOR CHARITY BOARD 
MEMBERS (N.D.). 
322. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT ch. 13 (2008) (providing
derivative suit provisions). 
323. See generally COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, ch. 15 (discussing shareholder
derivative suits). 
324. See Atkinson, supra note 262 (discussing standing issues); Mary Grace Blasko,
Curt S. Crossley & David Lloyd, Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 
37 (1993) (same); Brenda Bykin, The Nonprofit Corporation: in North Carolina: 
Recognizing a Right to Member Derivative Suits, 63 N.C. L. REV. 999 (1985) (arguing in 
favor of derivative suits for nonprofit corporations). 
325. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5250 (2005) (discussing members’ derivative suits);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55A-7-40 (2009) (discussing derivative suits by a member or a director);
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT ch. 13 (2009) (discussing derivative suits generally);
Id. § 13.02 (noting that a derivative suit may be brought by the lesser of five percent or fifty
persons with voting rights or any member or director of a designated body).
326. See generally COX & HAZEN, supra note 70, § 15:20 (discussing the awarding of
attorneys’ fees in derivative suits). 
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nonprofit directors’ liability make derivative suits unworkable in many 
situations. 
E. Qualified Immunity from Suit
The remedies for directors’ lapses are quite limited.  Nonprofit 
directors may take advantage of provisions in the nonprofit corporation act 
that permit directors to rely on officers and others in carrying out their 
duties, but directors will be held accountable for a lack of good faith and 
for not acting like a reasonable director under like circumstances.
327
  This 
means that directors must have a basis for believing that they are acting in 
the best interests of the corporation. 
Nonprofit directors in most states may take advantage of the limited 
immunity for volunteers.
328
  The rationale is that immunity will encourage 
volunteerism.
329
  Although some states remain outliers,
330
 the law in most 
states is that volunteers for charitable organizations, including directors 
who are not compensated, are absolved from liability if they act in good 
faith and are not guilty of reckless, wanton, or intentional misconduct.
331
  
Some states supplement volunteer immunity with specific statutes limiting 
liability for directors of charitable nonprofit corporations.
332
 
327. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2009) (stating general standard
for directors).  For examples of representative statutes, see CAL. CORP. CODE § 24001.5 
(2005) (discussing liability of officers and directors of nonprofit medical corporations); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 55A-8-30 (2011) (discussing duties of nonprofit directors); TEX. BUS. ORG. 
CODE § 22.221 (same). 
328. MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 231, § 85K (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.10 (2011).
329. Jill R. Horwitz & Joseph Mead, Letting Good Deeds Go Unpunished: Volunteer
Immunity Laws and Tort Deterrence, 6 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 585 (2009) (suggesting a positive 
correlation between immunity statutes and increased volunteerism). 
330. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-557d (2011) (abolishing the common law
defense of charitable immunity). 
331. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 231, § 85K (2011) (granting qualified immunity for
uncompensated directors of charitable educational institutions who act “in good faith and 
within the scope of his official functions and duties, unless such damage or injury was 
caused by willful or wanton misconduct”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.10(a)(2) (2011) 
(granting qualified immunity except for “gross negligence, wanton conduct, or intentional 
wrongdoing”); N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 (2011) (granting qualified immunity for charitable 
volunteers, including directors). 
332. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31(d) (2009) (stating a director of a
charitable nonprofit is not liable for acts or inaction except to the extent of any benefit 
received for having approved an unlawful distribution or for an intentional infliction of 
harm or an intentional criminal act). 
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In order to deal with outlier states, the federal Volunteer Protection 
Act
333
 was passed in 1997.  The Volunteer Protection Act, which excludes 
certain civil rights violations and violent acts,
334
 grants a qualified 
immunity for volunteers of nonprofit and also government organizations 
provided “the harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, 
gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference 
to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer.”335  The 
federal act, which applies to both federal and state claims,
336
 subject to 
stated exceptions,
337
 preempts state law unless the state law provides 
greater protection to the volunteer.
338
 
The general qualified immunity for volunteers may be supplemented 
in some states by statutes specifically granting a qualified immunity to 
nonprofit directors and officers.
339
  Some states provide that the immunity 
for directors does not extend to actions by the attorney general.
340
 
333. Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-19, 111 Stat. 219 (1997).
334. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(f) (2011).
335. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a)(3) (2011).
336. Armendarez v. Glendale Youth Ctr., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 1136 (D. Ariz. 2003)
(holding that the Volunteer Protection Act applies to both state and federal claims). 
337. The Volunteer Protection Act further provides that state law is not preempted in
certain additional circumstances: 
If the laws of a State limit volunteer liability subject to one or more of the 
following conditions, such conditions shall not be construed as inconsistent with 
this section: 
(1) A State law that requires a nonprofit organization or governmental
entity to adhere to risk management procedures, including mandatory
training of volunteers.
(2) A State law that makes the organization or entity liable for the acts or
omissions of its volunteers to the same extent as an employer is liable for
the acts or omissions of its employees.
(3) A State law that makes a limitation of liability inapplicable if the civil
action was brought by an officer of a State or local government pursuant
to State or local law.
(4) A State law that makes a limitation of liability applicable only if the
nonprofit organization or governmental entity provides a financially
secure source of recovery for individuals who suffer harm as a result of
actions taken by a volunteer on behalf of the organization or entity.  A
financially secure source of recovery may be an insurance policy within
specified limits, comparable coverage from a risk pooling mechanism,
equivalent assets, or alternative arrangements that satisfy the State that the
organization or entity will be able to pay for losses up to a specified
amount.  Separate standards for different types of liability exposure may
be specified.
42 U.S.C. § 14503(d) (2011). 
338. 42 U.S.C. § 14502 (2011).
339. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5239(a) (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 55A-8-60(a)
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Under the law of some states,
341
 as well as under federal law,
342
 the 
charitable director’s qualified immunity is waived to the extent that the 
volunteer is covered by liability insurance.  While at first glance, this might 
appear to mean that nonprofit directors should not ask for director and 
officer (D&O) liability insurance, this would not be a good approach.  One 
of the major benefits of D&O insurance is that the insurance covers not 
only liability but also the defense of any suit.  If suit is brought and the 
director wins on the basis of the qualified statutory immunity, the 
prevailing director would still be out of pocket for his or her legal defense 
costs.  Accordingly, it is prudent for nonprofit directors to make sure that 
the charity carries D&O insurance for its board members.
343
 
XIII. IS THE ABSENCE OF A MORE MEANINGFUL REMEDY A FATAL FLAW?
Qualified potential candidates would be less likely to serve on 
nonprofit boards if the law did not limit liability of nonprofit directors.  
Limited liability does not mean that directors lack incentive to perform 
their fiduciary duties.  There are collateral consequences a director has to 
worry about.  A nonprofit director who breaches his or her duty most likely 
will have that reputation follow them into the for-profit world.  Many 
nonprofit directors, especially of larger nonprofits, have significant 
positions with for-profit corporations and thus this collateral reputational 
taint is significant. 
The law imposing responsibilities and standards on nonprofit directors 
may also be viewed as largely aspirational.  Even in the for-profit world, it 
(2009). 
340. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 720-a (2011).
341. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539-10(b) (2011) (“To the extent that any charitable
organization or volunteer has liability insurance, that charitable organization or volunteer 
shall be deemed to have waived the qualified immunity herein to the extent of 
indemnification by insurance for the negligence by any volunteer.”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE § 84.004 (2011) (“[A] volunteer of a charitable organization is immune from 
civil liability for any act or omission resulting in death, damage, or injury if the volunteer 
was acting in the course and scope of the volunteer’s duties or functions, including as an 
officer, director, or trustee within the organization.”). 
342. 42 U.S.C. § 14503(d)(4) (2011).
343. While it is true that some personal umbrella policies and homeowners’ insurance
may cover nonprofit board service as well, the authors recommend a belt and suspenders 
approach by suggesting that corporation sponsored D&O insurance should be a candidate’s 
prerequisite to his or her willingness to serve on a nonprofit board regardless of the presence 
of homeowners’ or umbrella insurance that the candidate may otherwise have.  In addition 
to insurance, the Nonprofit Corporation Act provides for both mandatory and permissive 
indemnification by the corporation for a director’s expenses in litigating claims.  REVISED
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.50–8.58 (2008). 
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has been suggested that the law has not had a demonstrably significant 
impact on tightening directors’ standards of conduct.344  Heightened IRS 
and state attorney general involvement appear to be making the law a more 
significant factor in the context of nonprofit boards. 
XIV. CONCLUSION
As pointed out above, there has been criticism of enhanced scrutiny of 
nonprofit governance structures and operations.
345
  At the same time, the 
more vigorously the tax laws and state nonprofit laws are enforced, the 
more likely it is that abuses come to light.
346
  Based on this alone, it is 
difficult to conclude that there is too much regulation of nonprofit 
charitable organizations.  At the other extreme, many observers call for 
increased accountability and heightened regulation of nonprofits.
347
  After 
analyzing the existing regulation, we conclude that there is ample authority 
to vigorously enforce nonprofit directors’ obligations. 
State statutes clearly subject directors to high standards of keeping 
informed and overseeing the organization’s operations.348  These high 
standards are counterbalanced by immunity provisions that apply when no 
self-dealing is involved.  This appears to be an appropriate balance in order 
to deter inappropriate derivative litigation.  In cases of extreme misconduct, 
derivative litigation remains an option in most states.  Such private 
remedies, however, are merely ancillary. 
Charities and many other nonprofits provide a public benefit.  Since 
they are dealing in public goods, federal tax-exempt status provides a 
government subsidy.  State law also provides tax subsidies as well as 
providing the governing rules through nonprofit corporation acts and the 
like.  It is thus appropriate for the government agencies to step up as they 
have.  The IRS should continue its enhanced disclosure obligations and 
step up its vigorous enforcement efforts.  States such as California have 
344. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law,
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO.
L.J. 797, 800 (2001) (agreeing with “many commentators that the law has played a
relatively minor role in the evolution of board structure and behavior; market and other
social forces are far more important”) (citing Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and
Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1279–81 (1999)); Edward B. Rock & Michael L.
Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608, 1617 (2001)
(emphasizing attention to norms in a corporate setting).
345. See supra text accompanying note 126 (criticizing IRS policy).
346. See I.R.S. Form 990 (requiring disclosures of certain governance practices).
347. See Mayer & Wilson supra note 73, at 479 (arguing that state-based regulation is
more appropriate than relying on IRS rules). 
348. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–8.31 (2008).
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demonstrated that enhanced state law enforcement is effective.  State 
attorneys general should be given more resources in order to allow more 
aggressive pursuit of nonprofits similar to those that have occurred in 
California, New York, Oregon, and a few other states. 
